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ABSTRACT 
 
COALITION POLITICS IN TURKEY: 1991-2002 
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PhD Dissertation, Spring 2011 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı 
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Coalition government has been the dominant type of rule in Western Europe in the 20th 
century as countries increasingly reformed their electoral systems towards proportional 
representation. However, these governments are heavily criticized. They are argued to 
be difficult to form and govern, hence less durable compared to the majority party 
governments. This study aims to respond to these criticisms focusing on the Turkish 
coalition governments in the period between 1991 and 2002. It shows that the duration 
of party or coalition governments vary systematically between countries and within 
each country across time. Hence, the study mainly explores why some governments 
lasted long despite the political turmoil, economic crises and inter-party conflict, while 
others remained in power for merely a few months in Turkey. While discussing the 
dynamics of cabinet durability, it adopts a holistic approach in which all three phases of 
a government’s life – formation, maintenance and termination, are analyzed in 
interaction. The study perceives coalition politics as a set of continuous bargaining 
processes protraction of which put an end to the governments. Therefore, it also focuses 
on the communication between the political actors, and attempts to explain the factors 
that increase the level of mistrust and information uncertainty in the bargaining 
environment. Finally, the analysis of the coalition politics in Turkey is located within 
the wider inquiry on the multiparty politics in Western European democracies.  
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKĐYE’DE KOALĐSYON SĐYASETĐ: 1991-2002 
 
 
HASRET DĐKĐCĐ BĐLGĐN 
 
Doktora Tezi, Bahar 2011 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı 
 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Koalisyon siyaseti, hükümetin devamlılığı, koalisyon kurma 
süreçleri, koalisyon pazarlığı, uyuşmazlık yönetimi  
 
 
Yirminci yüzyılda giderek daha çok ülkenin nisbi temsil sistemini benimsemesiyle 
birlikte koalisyon hükümetleri Batı Avrupa’da en yaygın yönetim biçimi haline 
gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte koalisyon hükümetleri ciddi şekilde eleştirilmektedir. Bu tür 
hükümetlerin kurulmasının ve yönetilmesinin güç olduğu dolayısıyla tek parti 
hükümetlerine kıyasla daha dayanıksız oldukları iddia edilmektedir. Bu çalışma 1991-
2002 yılları arasında Türkiye’de kurulan koalisyon hükümetlerinden yola çıkarak bu 
eleştirilere yanıt vermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, tek parti hükümetlerinin ve 
koalisyon hükümetlerinin ömürlerinin ülkeden ülkeye ve aynı ülke içinde zaman içinde 
değiştiğini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, çalışmada temel olarak Türkiye’de siyasi 
çalkantılara, ekonomik krizlere ve partiler arası çatışmalara karşın neden bazı koalisyon 
hükümetlerinin uzun ömürlü olduğu buna karşın diğerlerinin neden sadece bir kaç 
iktidarda kalabildiği sorgulanmaktadır. Hükümetlerin dayanıklılığını belirleyen 
dinamikler tartışılırken, bir hükümet ömrünün her üç aşaması – kuruluş, yönetim ve 
bitiş- arasındaki etkileşim bütünlükçü bir yaklaşımla ele alınmaktadır. Çalışma 
koalisyon siyasetine kesintisiz müzakere süreçleri dizisi olarak yaklaşmaktadır. 
Hükümetlerin sona ermesi bu müzakerelerin tıkanmasıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Bu 
nedenle, çalışma siyasi aktörler arasındaki iletişime odaklanmaktadır ve müzakere 
ortamındaki güvensizliği ve bilgi belirsizliğini artıran etkenleri açıklamaya 
çalışmaktadır. Son olarak, Türkiye’de koalisyon siyasetinin incelenmesi Batı Avrupa 
demokrasilerindeki çokpartili siyasetle ilgili daha geniş bir araştırmanın çerçevesine 
yerleştirilmektedir. 
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ITRODUCTIO 
 
 
 
 
On May 6, 2010, British voters went to the polls. Pre-election surveys had shown 
that the general elections were very likely to return a hung parliament.
1
 This outcome 
was precedented by the 1974 elections, in which no party was able to get the majority 
of the votes. What the experts did not predict was a coalition agreement in the best 
known model of the first-past-the-post election system that was concluded in only five 
days between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. As of June 2010, United 
Kingdom became one of the nearly thirty countries in Europe ruled by coalition 
governments. David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party, commented on the 
coalition deal; “It really does look and feel different. Indeed, many of us are sitting next 
to people that we’ve never sat next to before” (The Guardian, 18.08.2010). This quote 
implies that a coalition government is a major political puzzle. It brings together not 
only politicians with disparate political values and norms, but also potentially 
incompatible expectations for ruling a country. The co-existence of differences is, 
indeed, the crux of coalition politics. It offers opportunities for representation of 
different views and interests in the society. However, this defining characteristic of the 
coalition government is also perceived as a weakness by some of the political elites and 
voters. Accordingly, it is argued that coalition arrangements cannot be maintained for a 
long period of time due to the differences between the partners. This view is widely 
held in Turkey where coalition governments historically have had a very negative 
image.
2
  
                                                           
1
 The official election results are available on the web site of the UK Office for National 
Statistics at <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/government/central-and-local-
government/elections--local--national-and-european-> (retrieved 08.05.2011).  
2 
Part of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 2011 re-election campaign was based on the 
drawbacks of a potential coalition government for Turkey. He argued that Turkey 
2 
 
Similar to many misconceptions, there is an element of truth in this argument. A 
number of coalition governments dissolved in a few months while others ruled for 
years. In other words, the duration of a coalition government varies systematically 
between countries and within a country at different times. Within a certain country, 
some coalition arrangements survive extensive dissent between the political parties, 
strong criticisms from the opposition parties, and unexpected crises such as natural 
disasters and economic meltdowns. Others, which might be formed by ideologically 
adjacent parties in a relatively crisis-free political context, last not much more than a 
few months. For example, the most recent coalition government in Turkey was formed 
by three parties with different ideological orientations in 1999: the center-left DSP, the 
nationalist MHP and the center-right ANAP. Just a few months after the cabinet was 
inaugurated, a major earthquake hit three major cities. Moreover, serious corruption 
charges targeted a number of cabinet members. However, it was one of the longest-
lasting cabinets in the Turkish history. On the other hand, the ANAP-DYP government, 
formed in 1996, perished through inter-party conflict in slightly more than three months 
despite the similarity in their policy platforms. The main research question of this 
dissertation focuses on this puzzle: what accounts for the variation in the duration of 
coalition governments? 
Since its transition to multiparty politics in 1950, 42 governments took office in 
Turkey. 7 of them were supra-party governments, while the rest were democratically 
elected. 15 of these governments were coalition arrangements. The first group of 
coalition governments emerged in the immediate aftermath of 1961 elections. Four 
coalition governments were formed in the period between 1961 and 1965. Four more 
coalition governments ruled in the second half of the 1970s. The rest of the coalition 
governments took office in the 1990s (Appendix 3). Indeed, coalition politics was the 
defining characteristic of this decade, since Turkey was ruled with alternating 
multiparty cabinets during this period with the exception of two minority governments, 
one of which failed to satisfy the constitutional requirement for taking office. During 
the 1990s, majority of the Western European democracies were also ruled by coalition 
governments. Just as in Turkey, coalition politics prevailed in Italy, Finland, Belgium, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
suffered extensively during the rule of the coalition governments as they have been 
unstable. “Koalisyon Geri Bırakır”, Milliyet, 26.01.2011.  
3 
 
Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg and Ireland. In 
France, Norway and Switzerland, the governments alternated between party and 
coalition cabinets. Durability of the coalition governments varied within Western 
Europe and Turkey in this period. Hence, taking a comparative approach, this study 
aims to analyze the dynamics of the variation in cabinet durability in Turkey within the 
wider European framework.  
Chapter 1 starts with a literature review. I trace the rise of cabinet durability as an 
area of interest in the study of coalition politics. Then, I evaluate the factors which were 
indicated to be influential in either extending or shortening the life of coalition 
governments. The literature seems to reach a consensus that the dynamics of cabinet 
durability can be best understood with a holistic approach. This means that there is an 
interaction between the three phases of the lives of governments; namely, formation, 
governance and termination. This interaction has implications on the formation and 
maintenance of the next cabinet, since each government contributes to the learning 
process with respect to the politics of coalition. Hence, an analysis considering cabinet 
duration as a life-cycle is likely to produce more reliable results. Bargaining, where 
coalition behavior is shaped through the interplay of the structural and exogenous 
factors, emerges as another area in coalition research. Chapter 1 forms the basis of my 
research in three ways. Firstly, drawing on the existing research, I delineate a list of the 
factors I use in my analysis of the Turkish case. Accordingly, the attributes of a cabinet 
such as size, ideological composition and majority status are important in order to 
elucidate the cabinets which will last longer. These attributes are shaped by the 
characteristics of the party system, and the formal and informal rules. Secondly, as the 
bargaining processes reflect the influence of these factors on the relations between the 
political actors, I also focus on the strategies of the parties. This also draws attention to 
how the leaders of the political parties manage crises, and how new processes of 
bargaining proceed. I also review the studies on the Turkish coalition governments 
extensively. Thirdly, the extant literature suggests the need for more detailed research 
on individual countries, as country-specific factors appear to have strong explanatory 
power. 
 
4 
 
 The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to design a process, which can yield detailed 
information on Turkey while maintaining a comparative perspective. This chapter 
draws on the hypotheses formulated on the basis of the literature review in Chapter 1. I 
begin with a discussion of the dominant research paradigm in the study of coalition 
politics. I, then, discuss the potential contributions of conducting a case-oriented 
approach with comparative concepts to a wider study of coalition politics and behavior. 
Lastly, I explain the stages of the research design conducted for this dissertation. In this 
context, after reviewing the literature for the potential factors that might have 
influenced cabinet durability in Turkey, I delved into the newspaper coverage on the 
coalition governments ruled between 1991 and 2002. In the daily newspapers, I mainly 
analyzed the accounts of the politicians, seeking any statements that might provide 
insight to the office and policy preferences, the interaction during the bargaining 
processes, the way they handled the relations between governing parties and their 
strategies to manage the crises. I constructed the question sheet for the in-depth 
interviews on the basis of these preliminary findings (Appendix 2). The content of the 
questions required interviewing the politicians who were actively involved throughout 
the period the cabinet was in power, especially during the bargaining process. Thus, I 
aimed to interview at least one minister from each party in each government, in order to 
exhibit diverse views on the factors that influenced the viability of the same cabinet.  
The later Chapters 3 and 4 are built on the analysis of the in-depth interviews in 
addition to the secondary sources such as newspaper statements, memoirs, official 
coalition documents, relevant articles and books. In Chapter 3, I focus first on the 
factors that constrained the political actors when they were crafting the coalition deals. 
The characteristics of the party system and the institutional rules included in the 
constitution are emphasized. The party system which was increasingly fragmented and 
polarized, especially in the mid-1990s, led to fierce competition for the leadership of 
the center-right and center-left. It also prevented formation of ideologically compact 
governments. It increased mistrust
3
 and information uncertainty between the 
                                                           
3
 In this dissertation, trust (and mistrust) refers to a conviction that others will act in our 
benefit or at least they do not intend to harm (Gambetti, 2000, p. 217). Ensuring a 
certain level of trust between politicians is important as it enhances cooperation and 
communication between the partners (Dekker and Uslaner, 2001, p. 2). In this context, 
the levels of trust and information uncertainty covary in an inverse direction. 
5 
 
prospective partners. Institutional rules pertaining to government formation, especially 
the investiture vote
4
 and the requirement of qualified majorities for legislation, resulted 
in an inclination towards forming oversized cabinets, which are more difficult to 
manage.  
The tensions in the political agenda over the rise of political Islam increased the 
freedom of movement of the military establishment. This reflected on the governments 
through the intervention of the head of state occasionally, again in the mid-1990s. The 
viability of the cabinets, emanating from such a bargaining environment dominated by 
office considerations overwhelmingly, varied based on the degree of influence from 
these dynamics. In the second part of this chapter, I evaluate the distribution of cabinet 
posts, and assess the relations between the government parties with regard to the 
strategies they adopted vis-á-vis each other. Finally, I analyze the mechanisms devised 
by the political actors to manage the conflicts.  
The impact of these mechanisms is pointed out in Chapter 4, where I specifically 
evaluate the dynamics underlying the variations in cabinet durability in Turkey 
throughout 1990s. Structural
5
 and institutional factors
6
 account for part of the variation. 
Contrary to the expectations derived from the literature, large coalitions which were 
formed with the support of more than two parties in Turkey tend to be more durable, as 
institutional rules would otherwise increase the likelihood of parliamentary defeat. As 
the characteristics of the party system mainly increased the competition between parties 
with similar ideological orientations, the ideologically heterogeneous cabinets tended to 
function more smoothly. One of the most interesting findings of this chapter is the 
dominance of institutional factors in the ways the governments ended. This suggests 
that counter-institutional mechanisms, which were devised to strengthen the acting 
                                                           
4
 Investiture vote, also known as the vote of confidence, is a constitutional requirement 
for the prospective cabinets to take office. Accordingly, the cabinet has to succeed in 
getting the support of majority in the parliament.  
5
 “Structural factors” refer to the characteristics of the cabinets and the party system 
throughout the dissertation. 
6
 In this dissertation, “institutional factors”refer to the rules pertaining to government 
formation and termination in the legal documents as well as the conflict management 
mechanisms.  
6 
 
cabinet and will be explained in the next chapter with examples, could have balanced 
the detrimental effects of the initial institutional constraints. Another important finding 
is that institutionalization of the relations between the partners contributes to durability 
regardless of the initial viability of a government. In other words, enhanced 
communication between the actors can extend a government’s life. The personal 
relations between the leaders of the I. DYP-SHP government (1991-1993) and the DSP-
MHP-ANAP government (1999-2002) were sufficient and effective enough to resolve 
minor crises through communication. The DSP-MHP-ANAP government also adopted 
a mechanism; such that the leaders of the cabinet parties gathered to resolve the crises 
between the top party executives. This prevented the potential escalation of the crises, 
and rendered a rich legislation record.  
In the Chapters 3 and 4, I focus mainly on the Turkish case giving occasional 
examples from the other democracies. However, Chapter 5 specifically locates the 
Turkish case within a wider European framework. I use the Cabinets and Coalition 
Bargaining Dataset (2008) compiled by Strom, Müller and Bergman. It has blocks of 
variables including structural attributes, preferences, institutions, bargaining 
environment and critical events. In Chapter 5, I examine the trends in cabinet durability 
across 13 countries and 42 coalition governments in Western Europe, in addition to the 
seven coalition governments in Turkey formed during the 1990s. In this chapter, the 
attempt to verify the dynamics stated in the literature in Chapter 1 yields inconclusive 
results. Instead, the institutional rules that aim to strengthen the motivations to maintain 
incumbent governments emerge as one of the most important factors affecting cabinet 
durability. The fewer incentives of the governing and oppositional parties to dissolve 
the government strategically, the more viable the cabinets become. More importantly, in 
the countries where the communication between the partners was strengthened through 
functioning governing bodies and conflict management mechanisms, cabinets lasted 
longer despite the unfavorable conditions of the party systems and the assorted political 
agenda. The consolidation of these mechanisms evolved into a learning process and 
strengthened the politics of accommodation. This process explains the improvements in 
cabinet durability across Western Europe over time.  
This research contributes to the literature on coalition politics, both in general and 
in Turkey, from a number of perspectives. Firstly, these findings verify that coalition 
7 
 
governments can be considerably durable. More specifically, this research provides 
substantial empirical findings to challenge the misconception that coalition 
governments in Turkey were predisposed to be merely short-term or weak. On the 
contrary, a number of governments survived longer than their counterparts in other 
countries such as Italy. Secondly, I concur with the institutionalist approaches to cabinet 
durability. Structural attributes might be influential in determining the initial type of the 
cabinet, and they certainly have implications on the partners once they agree on a 
coalition deal. However, maintaining the cabinet composition depends on the behavior 
of the political actors. This demonstrates the necessity to devise institutional 
mechanisms for increasing the communication between the parties, and to provide 
platforms in which they can resolve the crises. Finally, although this is a case-oriented 
study, it attempts to locate the Turkish case within a wider comparative perspective. It 
provides an analysis of whether the classical theories of coalition governments hold true 
in the Turkish case. I attempt to analyze the dynamics in Turkey by developing 
measures, which will be applicable in the analyses of coalition politics in other 
countries. Findings from my research with regard to the performance of the larger 
coalitions can also contribute to theory building. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE STUDY OF COALITIO POLITICS 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Development of the Study of Coalition Politics 
 
 
 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics defines a coalition as “… a team 
of individuals or groups that unites for a common purpose” (Strøm and Nyblade, 2007, 
p. 782). As the definition suggests, there are different types of coalitions. Countries may 
ally and engage in a joint operation in a certain country, for example to support the 
democratic opposition. Political parties may craft a pre-election coalition to overthrow 
an incumbent government. Individuals and civil society organizations may coalesce to 
campaign on an issue or policy. Coalitions also play an important role in the bargaining 
between and within the political parties in presidential regimes (Cheibub, Przeworski, 
and Saiegh 2004). Although there is a wide range of uses for a “coalition”, the term 
mostly refers to the coalition governments formed by two or more political parties 
(Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 6) in parliamentary democracies. From the end 
of World War II until the end of the 1990s, only 13 percent of the governments in 
Western Europe were formed by a single party as the rest was comprised of different 
forms of coalition governments (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 207).  
The pioneering studies of coalition governments emerged in the United States. 
The rise of rational choice theory as a dominant paradigm in the social sciences aroused 
an interest in the coalitions, as the theory aimed to understand the interactions between 
the actors. The Theory of Political Coalitions by Riker (1962) broke new ground by 
analyzing the bargaining processes for sharing the coalition payoffs. Riker relied on 
Down’s (1957) assumption that political actors are also rational actors, who try to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs. For this reason, political parties would 
9 
 
try to secure the parliamentary majority coalescing with the smallest possible number of 
parties, in order to have a larger share of the cabinet posts (Riker 1962, p. 32). Referring 
to this as the “size principle”, Riker presumed that the logical and rational result of the 
bargaining between the parties would thus be a minimal winning cabinet
1
, which is 
composed of parties whose total number of seats is just enough to acquire majority 
status in the parliament. In A Theory of Coalition Formation, Gamson (1961) also 
focused on the negotiations, and argued that the distribution of cabinet posts would be 
very likely to reflect the ratio of the seat shares of the cabinet parties vis-à-vis each 
other. The first generation of the study of coalition governments in the 1960s relied on 
the rationality assumption and adopted a game-theoretic perspective. These two studies 
have been a starting point for further research in three directions. The first and most 
important hypothesis (the size hypothesis) about the coalition formation process 
originated from these studies. Ensuing research has been testing whether minimal 
winning cabinets emerge as the most common type of coalition arrangements and 
whether size of the cabinet (measured in the number of the parties in the cabinet) has 
any impact on the cabinet duration. Gamson’s proposition has been referred to as 
“Gamson’s Law” or the “proportionality norm” and it has been in the center of the 
research on the allocation of the ministerial posts. Researchers have been analyzing 
distribution of the cabinets and trying to explain the potential factors that violate this 
norm. Finally, the first generation studies have set the methodological grounds. Hence, 
development of the coalition literature has been a response to these studies. 
Western European coalition governments continued to serve as the basis of 
research in the 1970s. Dodd (1976) tried to predict the types of coalition cabinets 
emanating from the communication and negotiations between the parties 
(undersized/minority, minimal winning, and surplus/oversize)
2
 based on the 
characteristics of the party system. He further analyzed which cabinet types enhanced 
                                                           
1 
A minimal winning cabinet is composed of parties whose total number of seats is just 
enough to secure parliamentary majority (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 1995, pp. 305-
309). 
2
 A surplus or oversize majority cabinet includes parties defection of which will not 
result in loss of the parliamentary majority. Lastly, an undersized or a minority coalition 
cabinet is the one whose combined parliamentary strength is below the parliamentary 
majority (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 1995, pp. 305-309). 
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cabinet durability, defining it as the maintenance of party composition. In this sense, 
cabinet durability has moved to the center of the research since 1960s. Axelrod (1970); 
on the other hand, expanded the size principle by taking policy preferences into 
account. He predicted the bargaining processes to form coalitions between the smallest 
number of ideologically compatible parties such that loss of a member will render the 
coalition no longer minimal or ideologically connected. In this way, Axelrod made an 
adjustment to the classification of the cabinet types by including the minimal winning 
connected cabinet.
3
 He also demonstrated a new perspective by showing the importance 
of policy preferences in coalition behavior. Two further developments in this period are 
the proliferation of the case studies (Groennings, Kelley, and Leiserson, 1970), and the 
European scholars’ enrollment to contribute to this field.  
Building on policy-driven motivations in coalition behavior, De Swaan (1973) 
argued that minimal winning coalition governments were not as frequent as expected, 
since the actors aimed to realize their policy preferences in addition to office 
considerations. The debate on the main dynamics of coalition behavior engendered 
prolific research as the number of the case studies and as large-N comparative research 
increased, stemming from heightened interest of the European scholars. Bargaining 
patterns in the formation of governments as well as the distribution of coalition payoffs 
were initial concerns. However, as cabinet durability ascended to the center of research, 
the focus on cabinet attributes, including size (introduced by Riker), ideological 
compatibility (introduced by Axelrod and De Swaan) and cabinet type (introduced by 
Dodd), stimulated new debates.  
The studies of the 1980s declared the beginning of a new divide in the literature. 
Traditional approaches pioneered by Dodd’s study were analyzing cabinet durability, 
which is defined as the potential of a particular cabinet to survive the constitutional 
inter-election period, as a function of cabinet attributes (size, ideological composition 
and type) and the party system. This first school of thought was referred as the 
structuralists or attributionalists. However, a new school of thought led by Browne and 
his colleagues started to question the essence of the inquiry. This school was known as 
the event process theorists. First and foremost, they challenged the possibility of the 
                                                           
3
 A minimal connected winning cabinet is a minimal winning cabinet whose member 
parties are also ideologically compatible. 
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inherent potential in a cabinet to endure. They argued that random shocks, such as 
political scandals and economic crises, might put an end to an acting cabinet regardless 
of the strength of a particular cabinet or the conditions of a political system. Similarly, 
weak governments might last for years in the absence of such critical events (Browne, 
Frendreis, and Gleiber, 1984). The controversy began to heat up with the emergence of 
a third approach. This approach, known as the strategic interaction approach, unified 
these contending models by including all possible variables into analyses. Proponents of 
this approach argued that critical events have been highly detrimental to the minority 
governments as well as governments in countries with more fractionalized and 
polarized party systems (King et al. 1990).  
The controversy dominating the literature in these two decades made a number of 
indispensable contributions to the ensuing literature in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
contending models of cabinet durability expanded the scope of the research,
4
 and led to 
the emergence of new studies (Warwick and Easton, 1992; Diermeier and Stevenson, 
2000). The debate emphasized that conceptualization and measurement of cabinet 
durability needs elaboration. The duration of the cabinets and the maintenance of party 
composition continued to be important. However, new research also focused on the way 
cabinets terminated in order to assess the importance of critical events (Grofman and 
van Rozendaal, 1997; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999; Laver, 2003; Lupia and Strøm, 
1995). Cabinet stability, in addition to durability, came under scrutiny. Accordingly, not 
only a long cabinet duration, but also the ease of its formation denoted cabinet stability 
(Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003, p. 63).  
Three further developments characterized the 1990s aside from these issues. The 
implications of coalition governments for the wider political system aroused further 
interest. Lijphart updated his previous research entitled Democracy in Plural Societies 
(1977) in the Patterns of Democracy (1999). He challenged the traditional coalition 
theories, and argued that the level of information uncertainty stemming from the 
characteristics of the party system, the political system and the policy considerations 
rendered surplus majority coalitions more likely. Referring to the coalition systems as 
“consensus democracies”, he emphasized that these systems outperformed the 
                                                           
4 
An article by Strøm, Browne, Frendreis, and Glieber (1988) outlines the main points 
of controversy. 
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majoritarian systems in many aspects and did not perform worse in the rest of 
performance indicators. The focus on government stability and performance generated a 
comprehensive sub-literature in the late 1990s and 2000s (Remarkable examples 
include: Huber, 1998; Huber and Arthur Lupia, 2001; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 
2004; Ireland and Gartner, 2001; Blais, Kim, and Foucault, 2010). These studies 
analyzed the relationship between the types of government (coalition versus party 
governments) and diverse indicators of stability such as democratization and economic 
performance.  
A revival of neo-institutionalism in the study of coalition politics was another 
remarkable characteristic of the 1990s. Strøm (1984) was intrigued by the pervasiveness 
of minority governments in some countries, even though the traditional theories of 
coalition formation attributed an inherent weakness to this type of government. He 
concluded that certain institutional mechanisms might lower the potential for 
parliamentary defeats and strengthen the chances of survival for minority governments. 
The implications of Strøm’s research reverberated in the 1990s with a renewed focus on 
the institutional rules pertaining to the coalition politics. These studies produced 
substantial empirical evidence pointing out the importance of cabinet formation rules in 
the emerging type of coalition cabinets. Existence or the absence of a vote of 
confidence (known as the investiture requirement) and the requirement of qualified 
majorities for constitutional amendments constituted the first set of rules pertaining to 
forming governments. A second group of rules aimed to balance the pressure of 
maintaining a majority. These included the constructive vote of no confidence
5
 and the 
rule of favoring the status quo government in case of a stalemate. Finally the powers of 
the heads of state and the prime minister set another set of institutional constraints in 
the analyses.
6
  
The studies of the 1990s reflected the accumulation of research and knowledge in 
various aspects of coalition politics. Hence, studies of this period initiated a more 
holistic approach to coalition arrangements. On the one hand, research analyzing 
                                                           
5
 “Constructive vote of no confidence” refers to a constitutional requirement of crafting 
an alternative cabinet composition for overthrowing an incumbent cabinet.  
6
 Cf. D. Diermeier et al. (2003) for a summary and review of the revival and 
development of neo-institutionalism in the study of coalition politics. 
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specific aspects of coalition governments continued to flourish. On the other hand, a 
number of books assembled the findings of the existing research to develop vast models 
which focused on the entire life-cycle of coalition governments all the way from 
formation to functioning, then to termination (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Laver and 
Schofield, 1998; Warwick, 1994; Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994).  
Contemporary research takes these articles and books as a reference point. 
Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Müller and Strøm, 2003) aims to combine 
the detailed information on the coalition governments in Western Europe with the 
holistic approach outlined above. Each chapter is devoted to a single country and 
analyses the institutional settings, characteristics of the party systems, bargaining 
patterns, coalition governance and cabinet durability together. Cabinets and Coalition 
Bargaining (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008) is a companion to this study by 
analyzing various aspects of coalition politics in 17 countries. These two books are the 
products of the Constitutional Change and Parliamentary Governments program.
7
 Two 
vast datasets were compiled in the project process, allowing researchers across Europe 
to conduct comparative research in coalition politics. The efforts to clarify the concepts 
related to coalition behavior engendered further research on measurement issues in the 
2000s (Horowitz, Hoff, and Milanovic, 2009; Conrad and Golder, 2010) as well. Hence, 
the accumulation of knowledge and development of research methodology 
characterized the 2000s. Currently, case studies become an area of interest once more as 
the large-N studies pointed to the importance of specific country effects in explaining 
the dynamics of coalition politics. Qualitative studies attract attention in this regard. 
Game-theoretic models continue to be applied to the bargaining processes. Finally, 
coalitions at the sub-national (local) and international levels become new venues of 
research (Bäck, 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Kreppel, 2002). However, cabinet 
durability continues to be at the center of concerns in all of these studies. Research 
focusing on other aspects such as conflict management and the functioning of coalition 
governments embodies an implicit or an explicit affiliation of the research topics to the 
length of these cabinets.  
 
                                                           
7
Details of this program is available at 
<http://www.erdda.se/ccpd/publications/coalition_governments_in_western_europe.php
> (retrieved 15.01.2010). 
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1.2. The Study of Cabinet Durability 
 
 
 
In my dissertation, I focus on the durability of coalition governments. 
Historically, the proponents of systems that render the emergence of majority party 
governments are more likely to accuse coalition governments of being inherently less 
durable. Accordingly, coalition governments are composed of political parties with 
diverse sets of policy preferences. Hence, the inherent risk of infighting between the 
partners characterizes coalition arrangements and renders them weak against 
challengers. As difficult as it is to form a coalition government, it is easy to break one 
up (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 12). In this context, coalition governments 
perform arguably worse compared to majority party governments as they suffer from 
inter-party conflicts which make legislation a daunting task.  
On the contrary, more than half a century of research on coalition governments 
established that coalition governments can be maintained throughout the entire inter-
election periods, and can perform as well as the majority party governments (Lijphart, 
1999). The variation in the cabinet durability between and within countries suggests 
that the dynamics that render a coalition cabinet more or less durable need to be 
uncovered. The dynamics of cabinet durability has engendered extensive interest 
especially since the 1980s. The contending approaches finally acknowledged that an 
inquiry of cabinet durability has to take various factors into account that are influential 
in different stages of coalition politics. Cabinet durability as such recognizes the impact 
of shocks exogenous to the cabinet, such as political scandals and economic crises, on 
an unexpected and premature termination of a government. However, some 
governments manage to survive these challenges while others give up. Moreover, the 
same government can cope with a random shock while it succumbs to pressure in a later 
stage (Laver and Shepsle 1998). This suggests that certain factors may strengthen or 
weaken the viability of a government.  
The oldest hypothesis in this regard is based on the size of a cabinet. It was 
argued that minimal winning cabinets are easier to manage and to limit the extent of 
conflict between the partners compared to surplus cabinets (Dodd 1976). Building on 
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the studies of Axelrod (1973) and de Swaan, the ideological compatibility of cabinet 
parties was explored (Warwick 1994, pp. 1-14). Even if the cabinet is oversized, the 
existence of similar policy preferences may decrease potential conflict, render 
legislation easier and possibly give the cabinet a defense against the criticisms of 
opposition parties. Enjoying the support of the majority of the parliament may 
obviously bolster a long life (Laver and Schofield 1998, pp. 150-151). These three 
characteristics of cabinets, referred to as the cabinet attributes, were considered to be 
the most important variables associated with durability (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 
1995, p. 319). The importance of cabinet attributes was also supported by empirical 
evidence. However, an analysis of cabinet attributes may only be the beginning of a 
course of research mainly for two reasons; 1. Any research focusing on variations 
between and within countries may yield inconclusive results, 2. Cabinet attributes 
emerge as an outcome of the interaction between political parties.  
The interaction and communication between parties before the formation of a 
government and during the cabinet is in power is referred as “bargaining” (Strøm, 
Müller, and Bergman 2008, p. 59). In coalition politics, the bargaining environment is 
highly complex. Although the parties draw on their experience from past deals, if any, 
with regard to the credibility of the other parties, it is still characterized by high 
information uncertainty and mistrust. Each party considers the implications of a 
prospective alliance in the next election (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008, pp. 57-59). 
They also expect diverse benefits from joining a coalition government. The earlier 
approach to the main motivations of the actors, as mentioned before, emphasizes the 
importance of acquiring the highest number of cabinet posts. This school of thought, 
referred to as the office-driven approach, presumes that enjoying the rewards of the 
offices dominates coalition strategies (Riker 1962; Gamson 1961). The later proponents 
of this school explain this motivation with reference to patronage politics. Patronage 
refers to the distribution of public resources in exchange for votes (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007, p. 83). Accordingly, in countries where the cabinet posts provide 
substantial discretionary access to public resources, office-seeking behavior will be 
predominant (Indridason, 2005, p. 462; Druckman and Warwick, 2005).  
The other school of thought, known as the policy-driven approach focuses on 
policy preferences. The scholars who put emphasis on the preeminence of policy 
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preferences point to the fact that the cabinet posts are the main instruments for the 
parties to implement the policies (Axelrod, 1970; de Swaan, 1973). Therefore, 
according to these scholars, the fact that parties negotiate the cabinet posts in the first 
place does not necessarily mean that they downgrade the policy issues. Moreover, while 
policies might be more important in one country, the distribution of offices might be 
more important in another (Schofield and Laver, 1985, p. 163). Limiting the 
explanation of coalition behavior to office-driven motivations was empirically 
challenged (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, p. 4; Budge and Keman, 1993, pp. 13-15). Hence, 
currently, the study of the motivations of the parties while bargaining analyzes the 
office and policy goals together (Müller and Strøm, 2003; Laver and Schofield, 1998). 
Current datasets, such as the Manifesto Research Dataset (Budge, Volkens, Bara and 
Tanenbaum, 2001; Klingemann and Volkens, 2006) and Comparative Political 
Datasets (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008; Müller and Strøm, 2003), integrate 
information on cabinet posts, their distribution and the bargains on policy programs. 
Several other studies also focus on both types of motivations (Baron, 1991; 1993; 
Budge and Laver, 1986; Budge, 1994; Budge, 2001). These studies indicate that actors 
have complex motivations, which contribute to the complexity of the bargaining 
environment. In this complex environment, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate 
information about the intentions and strategies of the other parties. Therefore, they 
might try to expand their support base by including different parties whose share of 
seats are not necessary for maintaining the parliamentary majority. They might also 
move toward ideologically closer parties for easier legislation.  
The motivations of prospective partners have been shaped by the characteristics 
of the party system, the institutional rules pertaining to government formation and 
political agendas. A polarized and fragmented party system exacerbates the information 
uncertainty inherent to the bargaining environment (Dodd, 1976; Laver and Schofield, 
1998). The electoral considerations become more important as voters in these party 
systems change their minds more quickly from one election to another. Hence, parties 
face a dilemma in the type of cabinet they will seek to form. They might either pursue a 
coalition formula with ideologically closer allies to increase the chances for a better 
legislation record, or they might try to exclude their closest competitors with respect to 
their electoral bases, in which case, they would have to expand the cabinet to counter 
act the attacks of the opposition. The existence of anti-system parties in parliaments 
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further influences the coalition formulas (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 569). In this sense, 
the characteristics of the party systems have repercussions on the bargaining 
environment, the cabinet type that will emerge and consequently on cabinet durability 
(Grofman and van Rozendaal, 1997).  
Similarly, institutional and decisional rules shape the considerations of parties 
during the bargaining process. Until the late 1980s, institutional settings were taken as 
given in the research of coalition governments. However, since this period, studies have 
emphasized that certain types of cabinets have become prerequisites of survival in some 
countries. Hence, constitutions have attracted increasing amounts of attention. The most 
important rule pertaining to government formation, in this sense, has been the 
investiture requirement. It stipulates getting a vote of confidence from the majority of 
the parliament. Consequently, minority governments have been rare and short-lived 
where this rule has been adopted (Strøm, 1990; Martin and Stevenson, 2001, p. 48). The 
pressure of maintaining a parliamentary majority also created a tendency towards 
forming surplus coalitions (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 100-102; Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 
1994; Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Similarly, the requirement of qualified majorities 
increases the possibility of surplus coalitions. A constructive vote of confidence 
originated in Germany, and has been adopted by Belgium (in 1995) and Spain to 
balance the destabilizing effect of the investiture.  
There have also been other formation rules rooted in the political agenda of some 
countries. The best example in this regard is the compulsory inclusion of parties 
representing language groups in Belgium. Among other rules, the prerogatives granting 
the heads of state to appoint the party leader for starting negotiations is very common. 
In some countries, the formation process is highly regulated by the position of the 
informateur and formateur. An informateur is responsible for communicating with the 
parliamentary parties to clarify their preferences to identify the points of agreement and 
the set of likely coalitions (De Winter, 1995, p. 120). He/she has often been selected 
among the retired bureaucrats, former ministers or party leaders so that the informateur 
may assume a certain degree of neutrality. He/she may consult with the heads of state 
about the optimal coalitions (Martin and Vanberg, 2003). The informateur may 
nominate a formateur or just report about the potential formateurs who may craft a 
cabinet which succeeds in getting the support of the majority of the parliament (Golder, 
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2010, p. 4). Whether the formateur prioritizes office or policy concerns, and also the 
position of his/her party in the political space shapes not only the type, but also the 
ideology of the government (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Baron 1991). By using 
his/her authority to appoint the formateur, the president tries to increase the chances for 
a government which is ideologically closer to himself/herself to be established and if 
possible, a government that includes the party that the president has been affiliated 
with, especially in the countries where the president is elected with popular vote (Kang, 
2009, p. 563; Laver and Schofield, 1998). Legislative rules for constitutional 
amendments and the dissolution of parliament; on the other hand, might also influence 
stability (Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994, p. 319). Institutions are thus critical for 
government duration in the sense that they “can make two otherwise similar coalition 
systems as different as chalk and cheese” (Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 214).  
As the research on bargaining patterns expanded, scholars increasingly noticed 
that bargaining is not limited to the formation of governments. On the contrary, the 
entire politics of coalitional life-cycle is an ongoing bargaining process (Laver, 2008; 
Gallagher, Laver, and Mair, 1995, p. 302). The effects of the conditions of the party 
system impose constraints on the actions of parties. Moreover, constitutions also outline 
rules pertaining to coalition governance. In countries where rules enforce collective 
cabinet responsibilities, parties do their best to maintain the government to avoid losing 
votes (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). In addition to the party system and institutional 
constraints, coalition governments are subject to the vagaries of political agendas. The 
threat posed by a war might enforce durable coalition governments as was the case in 
the United Kingdom in the 1920s.  
 
 
 
1.3. The Study of Coalition Politics and Cabinet Durability in Turkey 
 
 
 
Coalition governments prevailed in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s in Turkey. Nearly 
40 percent of all governments have been multiparty arrangements since the first fair 
elections held in 1950. The reformation of the electoral system towards proportional 
representation in the early 1960s resulted in the fragmentation of the party system and 
the emergence of coalition governments. There have been 15 coalition governments in 
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three different decades in Turkey, which provides high variance that is conducive to 
detailed analysis. However, the cross-country studies excluded the Turkish coalitions, 
and the studies by Turkish scholars are few in number compared to the scope of the 
available data.  
The most notable study to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish 
coalition governments is the Parlamenter Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri 
(Coalition Governments in the Parliamentary Democracies) (Sayarı, 1980). The study 
focuses on the coalition arrangements in the 1960s and the 1970s. It aims to integrate 
the Turkish case with the wider coalition literature by testing the hypotheses set by the 
first generation coalition theorists. The characteristics of the party system, the 
ideological compatibility of the governing parties and the size of the cabinet are 
analyzed. Furthermore, the study provides empirical evidence to support the influence 
of intra-party politics, political culture, the constraints of the political agenda and the 
decision-making processes on cabinet duration. One of the most interesting findings of 
this study is the dominance of office considerations in the coalition behavior during 
these decades.  
New studies emerged in the mid-1990s as a new decade of coalition governments 
started. Ilirjani modeled the coalition bargaining between 1995 and 1998 (Ilirjani, 2000) 
on the basis of Laver and Shepsle’s model of government formation (Laver and 
Shepsle, 1996). Another study focused on political decision making in coalition 
governance (Aleskerov, Ersel, and Sabuncu, 1999). The distribution of bargaining 
power between the parties and the stability of the party system during the 1990s was 
also analyzed (Aleskerov, Ersel and Sabuncu, 2000). The most notable studies took 
place towards the end of the 1990s and in the most recent decade. Heper and Başkan 
(2001) tested three main and two corollary hypotheses developed by Budge and Keman 
(1993) on the Turkish case. They analyzed the coalition governments from the 1960s to 
the late 1990s and found that the Turkish case differentiated from the European 
countries on all three of the hypotheses such that Turkish parties did not coalesce 
against threats to democratic regimes; they did not form the cabinets on the Left-Right 
cleavage when it is salient; they did not refrain from forming coalitions with anti-
system parties unless threatened by the military, and they were predominantly office-
oriented, unlike their European counterparts. The authors explained this situation on the 
20 
 
basis of unresolved regime issues around the divide between secularism and religiosity 
as well as strong state tradition that divided the elite. They also argue that both 
cleavages enhanced the operation of the political patronage (Heper and Başkan, 2001, 
pp. 80-83). There are also a number of studies that focused on the particular 
governments such as the DYP-SHP governments in the first half of the 1990s 
(Saybaşılı, 1995) and the DSP-MHP-ANAP government (Beriş and Gürkan, 2001). 
Two books covered all of the coalition governments; from the first one formed by CHP 
and AP to the most recent one in 1999. Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Koalisyon (Coalitions 
in the Turkish Political Life) provides rich factual data (Kara, 2007). Türkiye’de 
Koalisyon Hükümetleri: 1961-2002 (Coalition Governments in Turkey: 1961-2002) 
adopts a more analytical perspective. In a chronological order, it analyzes the 
formation, functioning and termination of the governments (Yalansız, 2006). The most 
important contribution of this book is that it devoted special importance to the 
interaction between the actors and found that a political culture characterized by 
conflict and the absence of accommodation motivations has been the primary factor that 
decreased cabinet durability. There are many other books written by journalists such as 
Arcayürek and Bildirici, which serve as memoirs and are helpful for gaining insight in 
to the details of the events.  
There are also contributions by economists. These studies generally focus on the 
government performance and explore the relationship between the type of government 
(coalition vs. majority party) and stability. Tutar and Tansel (2000) inquired whether 
the coalition governments tended to increase budget deficits.  In another study, Tutar 
and Tansel (2011) tested whether government type influenced the state’s budget-to-
GNP ratio. Other authors discussed the relation between government type and economic 
growth (Eren and Bildirici, 2001). Şanlısoy and Kök (2010), on the other hand, found 
that political instability impeded economic growth. These studies; however, tended to 
take being a coalition government as one of the four major sources of political 
instability for granted without questioning whether instability stems from government 
type or other factors. Moreover, they were inconclusive with regard to verifying the 
relation between the type of government and performance. They either focused on a 
single aspect of economic performance or used various types of economic data 
(quarterly, monthly etc.). Preferences for different measures of performance and types 
of data produced contradictory outcomes.  
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A particular study of the relationship between the type of government and 
stability has remedied this problem. It developed a comprehensive measure of economic 
performance based on major macroeconomic indicators. This study found that coalition 
governments performed poorly on management of the economy with respect to majority 
party government; nevertheless, the author admitted that majority party governments 
also remained far from being effective managers (Karaca, 2003). A political scientist, 
Kalaycıoğlu (2002) specifically focused on the relationship between government type 
and economic performance, and reached a similar conclusion. He found that coalition 
governments did not necessarily perform worse than party governments (Kalaycıoğlu, 
2002, p. 65). More importantly, he also pointed out that although majority party 
governments have been more durable in general, a number of coalition governments 
have also been quite stable in the case of Turkish governments (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, p. 
65). Besides, Kibritçioğlu (2007) found that the RP-DYP coalition government in the 
period between 1996 and 1997 was one of the governments which best improved bad 
indicators, providing evidence that short government duration did not necessarily mean 
bad performance.  
 
 
 
1.4. The Trends in the Study of Cabinet Durability 
 
 
 
Since the 1960s, a large body of literature emerged in the study of coalition 
politics, and cabinet durability has been at the center of research. Therefore, the sub-
literature considering durability followed the general literary trends. Statistical 
techniques have been increasingly used in this period. The availability of new 
techniques has led to the emergence of large datasets, most of which have been public 
to aid in repeating the analyses. The most recent and notable dataset is the Comparative 
Political Dataset. Other than the large datasets specifically compiled for coalition 
research by scholars such as Strøm, Müller, Bergman, Warwick, Laver, Shepsle and 
Schofield, several studies have relied on specific datasets assembled on the basis of the 
information from the general data archives such as Keesing’s World News Archive and 
Political Yearbooks of the European Journal of Political Research.  
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Another trend in the research methodology in the study of coalition politics has 
been the increasing popularity of game-theory. The centrality of bargaining to coalitions 
resulted in substantial research using game-theoretic methods for analyzing the 
bargaining processes. The game-theoretic model in coalition research was first 
developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and the number of game-theoretic studies in 
the field increased, particularly in the most recent two decades parallel to the increased 
popularity of game theory in general (Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting, 2005). 
These studies either model the actual bargaining that took place during a certain 
government’s establishment or design experimental coalition games to understand the 
actor behavior under a given set of conditions (e.g. Kaarbo and Lantis, 1997; Diermeier 
et al., 2008; Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003; Budge and Herman, 1978; Anderson 
1967; Albers, Crott, and Murnighan 1985). The scope of the research also expanded in 
time. There has been increasing interest in the coalitions at the local (Zariski, 1984; 
Bäck, 2003; Steunenberg, 1992; Skjaeveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen, 2007) and 
supranational levels, such as the studies of coalition building in the European 
Parliament (Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999).  
The increased emphasis on research techniques indicates that the study of cabinet 
durability might need further methodological refinement. The measure used in the 
analysis might change the inferences that will emerge (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999; 
Diermeier and Van Roozendaal, 1998, p. 615). For instance, many studies do not look 
at the days spent in forming a government. A government term is measured from the 
day it was installed to the day it officially delivered the mandate to its successor. 
However, sometimes the government formation process takes as long as months. This 
period is counted as the term of the already-existing one, which can cause the 
government life-spans to be miscalculated. Consequently, two governments appear 
similarly stable, but perhaps are not (Conrad and Golder, 2010). In relation to this point, 
the existing research is not conclusive about the factors that can shorten coalition 
governments’ life. In other words, a factor which is influential in one country is not so 
in another (Warwick and Easton, 1992, p. 126). This point also suggests once more that 
short government duration is not an endemic characteristic of coalition governments.  
As far as the literature on the Turkish coalition governments are concerned, the 
rich factual knowledge hailing mainly from the articles in the daily newspapers 
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provides a strong ground for detailed analysis. Moreover, these studies adopted a 
holistic approach. Although the majority of the studies have been journalistic and 
narrative, there are a small number of studies mentioned above which provide analytical 
insight. They reveal that many aspects of coalition politics still need elaboration in the 
light of the recent developments in the theories of coalition. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIG AD METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to analyze the dynamics of cabinet 
durability in the coalition governments, which were formed in Turkey in the period 
between the elections in 1991 and in 2002. It aims to locate the Turkish case within a 
wider inquiry on the multiparty politics. This chapter explains the design of the research 
carried out in this dissertation. I begin with discussing the development of the research 
on coalition politics from a methodological perspective. I, then, elaborate on the 
potential contributions of a within case analysis to the study of coalition politics. Lastly, 
I delineate the progress of my research.  
The pioneering studies in the field of coalition politics emerged in the immediate 
aftermath of the behavioral revolution. During this period, a variety of statistical 
techniques was developed that enable the researchers to conduct analyses on large 
datasets. Quantitative approach has become the dominant research paradigm in the 
leading journals of political science since 1970s.1 Cabinet durability has been a central 
inquiry in the initial studies of the field since 1960s, and the ensuing research design 
reflected the dominant methodological trend in the social sciences. Students of coalition 
politics collected information on the characteristics of the governments and the party 
systems in a number of countries in different time periods. More recent books and 
articles published in the last two decades indicate that this methodological trend still 
                                                           
1 Bennett, Barth, and Rutherford (2003) review the methodological trends in the 
research in social sciences drawing on the articles published in the journals with a high 
level of impact factors. They find that over 60 percent of all the articles used statistics, 
while case study was used in less than 20 percent of the articles published in top seven 
journals in the field of Comparative Politics.   
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prevails.2 The datasets have been expanded with the observations from the countries 
which were excluded in the previous studies. More recent studies focus on a larger set 
of independent variables and interpret the factors which fit best. Quantitative 
inference’s empirical strength in the field of coalition politics stems from three main 
aspects. It enables the researchers to “predict” the factors which are likely to influence 
cabinet durability. Through the significance tests, we can eliminate alternative 
hypotheses. The effects of these factors can be isolated from each other as well. This 
provides information about the extent of the influence of a factor on the duration of the 
cabinets. Lastly, the gist of these studies is the comparative kernel. The high level of 
abstraction allows for better comparison.   
The explanatory power of these cross-national studies is limited in understanding 
the dynamics of cabinet durability in individual countries. Most of the variation is 
explained by the variables which refer to the interaction of a factor within a country 
(Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008, p. 416). In other words, although the variables 
associated with cabinet attributes, party systems and institutional settings yield 
statistically significant results; cabinet durability is mostly determined by the interaction 
of these factors at the national level. Moreover, these studies mainly “predict” the 
causes rather than explain the causal mechanisms. Hence, they provide limited 
information as to how a factor interacts with the other characteristics of a political 
system and affects the duration of a cabinet. Coalition politics is multifaceted and 
highly complex. Even if the same factors seem to be influential in two factors, different 
operation of the causal mechanisms may result in different levels of durability. This 
indicates that despite the voluminous research on the coalition governments, it is still 
necessary to make in-depth research on the individual countries.  
Deeper analysis of a class of cases within a country, in this sense, may improve 
conceptual validity and enable us to explore the causal mechanisms (George and 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 19-21). Such analysis may still maintain a comparative merit by 
relying on the concepts which are applicable in the other countries (King, Keohane, and 
                                                           
2 Warwick’s study (1994, pp. 149-161) represents one of the earlier attempts to develop 
comprehensive models in the period. The research of Saalfeld (2008, pp. 340-341); on 
the other hand, is one of the most recent studies in this perspective. It integrates the 
critical events to the model and uses “cox proportional hazards” technique to predict the 
determinants of government termination.  
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Verba, 1994, p. 43; Ragin, 1989, p. 34).3 In this way, it may also contribute to testing 
and building theories (Lijphart, 1971, p. 692; Landman, 2008, pp. 34-35). Conducting a 
case-oriented research with a comparative merit requires a mixed methodology as its 
definition suggests. Indeed, in the course of time, the research projects have become 
more comprehensive focusing on the interactions of different dimensions of the same 
phenomenon. As aptly put in a study, “If we are to understand the rapidly changing 
social world, we will need to include information that cannot be easily quantified as 
well as that which can” (King et al., 1994, p. 5). Hence, the need for a mixed 
methodology has been increasingly recognized in comparative politics since mid-1980s 
(Bennett et al., 2003). In the field of coalition politics, the need for combining large-N 
and small-N research has become more widespread in the last decade as there is the 
need for explaining the “meditational processes” of how an event or an institution effect 
the decisions of the actors (Druckman, 2008, p. 480). In this context, for instance, Bäck 
and Dumont (2007, p. 468) proposed a two-stage analysis. A statistical analysis should 
be made to predict the causes in isolation as the first stage, and the deviant cases should 
be analyzed in detail to understand the causal mechanisms as the second one.  
In this study, I follow a similar approach in a different way. I first develop 
measures to analyze the cases in Turkey, which may also be applicable in the other 
countries. Then, I compare the Turkish cases with the other countries which were ruled 
by coalition governments in the same time period. This way, this research design 
enables zooming in the operation of the causal mechanisms pertaining to durability 
within Turkish coalition governments. The within-case analysis (Miles and Huberman, 
1994) may also be used to seek patterns to see whether the cases fit the theories of 
coalition. The design is also useful in eliminating the rival explanations. Drawing on the 
similarities and differences in Turkey and the Western European democracies, it seeks 
the factors which appear in the countries with similar levels of average cabinet 
durability (Ragin, 1989).4 Throughout the research, I conceive Turkish coalition 
building dynamics not as idiosyncratic but as comparable cases that may help elaborate 
                                                           
3 This type of research design is increasingly referred as the “comparative case study” 
or the “case-oriented comparative method”. 
4 This method is known as the Method of Agreement. It was first argued by John Stuart 
Mill in A System of Logic (1843).  
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on the existing theories in order to locate the Turkish case within a wider analysis on 
the variation in cabinet durability between and within the countries.  
An extensive review of the literature allowed me to derive a set of hypotheses. 
After the literature review, I collected information from the newspaper coverage on the 
coalition governments in the period between 1991 and 2002.5 In my review of the daily 
newspapers, I specifically focused on the press speeches and declarations of the 
politicians who were actively involved in the formation and maintenance of the 
governments. At this stage, I aimed to find evidence with respect to the factors 
influencing perceptions of the actors about the strategies and motivations of each other. 
The newspaper review has been especially useful in shedding light on the dynamics of 
the interaction between the political actors. It provides fruitful insight into which threat 
perceptions have governed their decisions in preferring certain parties over the others 
for coalition partnerships. I also examined the written documents on the coalition 
governments such as the coalition protocols and government programs to observe the 
reflections of these perceptions.6 Furthermore, I read journalistic studies, memoirs and 
books on the coalition governments in Turkey.  
Building on the review of the scholarly literature and aforementioned resources of 
information, I begin with questioning whether coalition governments in Turkey and in 
Western Europe are less durable compared to the majority party governments. In all 
countries including Turkey, cabinet duration varies with respect to the type of 
government between the countries and across time. Hence, my main research question 
is what accounts for the variation in the durability of coalition governments in Turkey 
assessing the dynamics in a wider comparative perspective. I argue that analyzing 
which types of coalition cabinets last longer may be a good point of departure. 
Therefore, I begin with examining the attributes or the characteristics of the cabinets. 
First, I suggest that cabinets enjoying parliamentary majority have better survival 
chances. However, securing parliamentary majority is not enough for functioning well, 
if the cabinet is too large to be managed, or the coalition partners have very different 
                                                           
5 I reviewed the daily Milliyet, Hürriyet and to a certain extent Cumhuriyet for this 
period. 
6 Public versions of these documents are available at 
<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hukumetler.htm> (retrieved on 18.01.2010).  
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policy platforms. Hence, I expect minimal winning cabinets to last longer than the 
minority and surplus majority cabinets. Similarly, I anticipate that the more mixed the 
governments are with respect to the positions of the cabinet parties in the policy space, 
the shorter they last.  
A cabinet is more associated with the prime minister and his/her party affiliation 
than the government (Müller and Strøm, 2003); however, in this study as primary focus 
is not on these differences; the concepts of cabinet and government are used 
interchangeably. I count a new cabinet with each parliamentary election, change of 
party composition or change of the prime minister (Strøm, Müller, Bergman, 2008, p. 
6). In this sense, there are nine cabinets in Turkey during the period between the 1991 
elections and 2002 elections, seven of which are coalitions. The size of a cabinet, 
whether it is “large” or “small”, refers to the number of the political parties in the 
cabinet. The cabinet types are defined as follows: A minimal winning cabinet is 
composed of parties whose total number of seats is just enough to secure parliamentary 
majority. A minimal connected winning cabinet is a minimal winning cabinet whose 
member parties are also ideologically compatible. A surplus or oversize majority 
cabinet includes parties defection of which will not result in loss of the parliamentary 
majority. An undersized or a minority coalition cabinet is the one whose combined 
parliamentary strength is below the majority of the parliament (Gallagher, Laver and 
Mair, 1995, pp. 305-309). Finally, the ideological distance between the cabinet parties 
reflects a general positioning on the left-right spectrum. In Turkey, while parties such as 
DSP, SHP and CHP as well as the pro-Kurdish parties have been located to the left of 
the center; ANAP, DYP, RP and MHP were situated to the right of the center. The 
positions of the parties in the policy space have been persistent across time (Çarkoğlu 
and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 117). Accordingly, except for two cabinets (ANAP-DYP and 
RP-DYP), the rest of the coalition governments were ideologically heterogeneous in 
this period. In determining the types of Turkish cabinets in the 1990s, I rely on the data 
from an ongoing project entitled Party Switching in Turkey. 1991-2002 (Kemahlıoğlu 
and Sayarı, 2011). It provides the information of the number of seats each party had per 
month.7  
                                                           
7 I am grateful to Özge Kemahlıoğlu and Sabri Sayarı for allowing me to use their 
dataset although the project is still in progress. 
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I argue that the type of the cabinet emanates from the bargaining processes, and it 
is an outcome of the dynamics operated in the formation of the governments. I suggest 
that the behavior of the actors during the bargaining process is constrained by the 
characteristics of the party system and the institutional framework. As such, I expect 
that the higher the degree of fragmentation and polarization, the longer the durability of 
the governments. The characteristics of the party system have effects on the number of 
the parliamentary parties and the set of both available and “legitimate” coalition 
partners. In countries where a fragmented party system was plagued also by high 
electoral volatility and polarization, parties tend to prioritize future electoral 
considerations and competition over the leadership of the ideological blocks increases 
the level of mistrust and information uncertainty between the parties. I measure 
fragmentation as the effective number of political parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) 
and polarization as the seat share of the extremist parties. The formal institutions such 
as the vote of confidence and requirement of qualified majorities for constitutional 
requirement bolster the fears of the actors with regard to parliamentary defeat. 
Availability or absence of the institutions, which make overthrowing a government 
more difficult, also play a role in cabinet duration. In this sense, I expect that in 
countries where institutional mechanisms render government formation easier and 
termination more difficult, the cabinets tend to last longer. Similarly, the wider the 
scope and number of conflict management mechanisms, the longer the cabinets tend to 
last. I look at the institutions pertaining to the formation, maintenance and termination 
of the governments in this context. I explore whether the constitutions include articles 
on the vote of confidence, qualified majorities, motions of censure and other 
institutions. I further explore whether the parties devised platforms for resolving the 
inter-party problems. The different trajectories of the countries suggest that the issues 
on the political agenda and the extra-parliamentary actors also constrain the decisions of 
the government parties. Therefore, I examine the powers and roles of heads of state, 
business circles and the military establishment where applicable.   
I aimed to verify or discard these arguments through in-depth interviews based on 
a semi-structured question form (Appendix 2). The content of the questions pertain to 
the details of the bargaining process in the formation of the governments and later 
during the crisis. Therefore, I tried to interview the individuals who served in the 
coalition governments between 1991 and 2002. Obviously, the nature of the research 
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does not allow a random sampling. However, I increased variation within the sample by 
targeting to interview at least one minister from each party of each cabinet (List of 
interviewees is available in Appendix 1). I also managed to interview a number of 
politicians who served in multiple cabinets. This allowed me to make a better 
comparison in understanding the transformation of the dynamics in consecutive 
cabinets. I conducted in-depth interviews in Ankara and Đstanbul. Each one lasted 
around an hour and a half. I began with asking how the interviewee’s party decided to 
begin negotiating with the prospective partner. In this part, I asked the details of 
bargains and motivations of the parties. In the second part, I gave specific examples 
from the events of the period and asked questions about how the parties solved the 
crises. In the final part, I tried to understand their perceptions as to the turning points in 
the life of the governments. I also asked about how they evaluated the powers of the 
heads of state, how they evaluate coalition governments with respect to main 
advantages and drawbacks and how they perceived the differences and similarities 
between the Turkish and Western European coalition governments. I assume that the 
politicians I interviewed with are rational actors who have tried to maximize their 
benefits while minimizing costs.  
For the comparative analysis, I use the Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining 
Dataset (Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2008).8 This dataset includes both party and 
coalition governments from 1945 until January 1999 in seventeen Western European 
democracies. During the 1990s, coalition governments were formed in thirteen 
countries: Italy, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Iceland. Therefore, I compare the 
dynamics only in these countries with those of Turkey. Since the period I analyze for 
Turkey ends in November 2002, I updated the dataset so as to include the governments 
formed between January and December 1999 regardless of the date the governments 
came to an end. In Chapter 5, I look at the period between 1990 and 2006.  
 
                                                           
8 I would like to thank Torbjörn Bergman for sharing the dataset before it was made 
public.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
COALITIO FORMATIO AD GOVERACE, 1991-2002 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the coalition governments of the 1990s with respect to 
how they were formed and governed. The scholarly literature on coalition governments 
in Western democracies emphasizes the importance of the characteristics of party 
systems in the formation, maintenance and breakdown of coalition arrangements 
(Müller and Strøm, 2003; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, 2008; Warwick, 1994; Budge 
and Keman, 1993; Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Consequently, my analysis in this chapter 
begins with exploring the major trends in Turkish party politics and party systems 
between the period of 1991 to 2002. The literature on coalition governments similarly 
focuses on the importance of formal (i.e. institutional rules) and informal (i.e. extra-
parliamentary) constraints on the bargaining processes and functioning of the 
governments (Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003; Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994). 
These issues are discussed in this chapter next, followed by the elaboration of the 
interaction between the governing parties during the governance. 
 
 
 
3.1. Turkish Party System in the 1990s 
 
 
 
Following the 1980 military coup, Turkey had majority party governments from 
1983 to 1991. During this period, governments were formed by ANAP which enjoyed 
parliamentary majorities with ease until the 1991 parliamentary elections that did not 
produce a majority party in the parliament. Instead, five parties shared the seats. Two 
major parties of the center-right secured substantial number of deputies in the 
parliament (DYP, 178; ANAP, 115 seats) followed by the social democrats (SHP, 88 
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seats). A pro-Islamist party, RP, managed to enter the parliament as well and obtained 
62 of the seats, while another center-left party, DSP, secured 7 seats (Table 3.1.). The 
1995 elections highlighted the increasing amount of popular support for the pro-Islamist 
RP which had already proven that it had become, in Sartori’s terms (1976), a “relevant 
party” in the 1991 elections. Parliamentary elections in 1995; on the other hand, 
signaled the decline of the center-right, namely DYP and ANAP, and demonstrated that 
electoral support for the center-left parties was further diminishing. The collapse of the 
center accelerated further in the 1999 elections. DSP came first largely due to the 
capture of Öcalan during its minority government. MHP doubled its vote share with 
respect to the previous election. FP, the successor of RP, could not reach RP’s vote 
share in the previous elections and came third. 
Table 1. Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, 1991-2002 
1991 Elections 1995 Elections 1999 Elections 
Party 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats Party 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats Party 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats 
DYP 27.03 178 RP 21.38 158 DSP 22.19 136 
ANAP 24.01 115 ANAP 19.65 132 MHP 17.98 129 
SHP 20.75 88 DYP 19.18 135 FP 15.41 111 
RP 16.88 62 DSP 14.64 76 ANAP 13.22 86 
DSP 10.75 7 CHP 10.71 49 DYP 12.01 85 
   
MHP 8.18   CHP 8.71   
   
HADEP 4.17   HADEP 4.75   
  
    
  BBP 1.46   
  
    
  Independents 0.87 3 
  
    
  
  
  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the Turkish party system was characterized by high 
electoral volatility, ideological polarization and fragmentation. Although these major 
trends have been salient since the beginning of the multiparty period, each indicator 
peaked between 1991 and 2002 (Çarkoğlu, 1998). Among the features of the party 
system, fragmentation has been the most important trend, one that impinges upon the 
formation and functioning of governments (Figure 3.1.). Although several factors such 
as deepening social cleavages can be considered to explain the rise of fragmentation 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 1997; Hazama, 2003), concomitant splits within the center-right and the 
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center-left, as well as gradual erosion of electoral support to these parties, have been the 
primary sources (Sayarı, 2002). The way the party system was fragmented had major 
implications for the bargaining environment. Division within the center was the main 
cause of fragmentation, and it was accompanied by high electoral volatility. This 
prevented emergence of a dominant party which could have become a platform for 
alternative coalitions (Sayarı, 2007, p. 203) similar to the Christian Democratic parties 
in Italy and Luxembourg. Animosities between the party leaders rather than policy 
platform differences within the center parties increased fragmentation (Başlevent, 
Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar, 2004, p. 310). This was also reflected in the relations 
between the party leaders in the bargaining process.  
 
Another factor that increased the level of fragmentation in this period was party 
switching (Kemahlıoğlu and Sayarı, 2011). Information uncertainty is one of the key 
factors that shape the interaction between the parties in the coalition governments 
(Dodd, 1976; Luebbert, 1983; Budge and Keman, 1993; Martin and Vanberg, 2004). In 
the Turkish case, switching to another party or establishing a new party reinforced 
mistrust within and between the parties, and changed the distribution of the bargaining 
power.1 For instance, a considerable number of deputies switched from DYP to ANAP 
right before RP and DYP concluded the coalition agreement, which weakened DYP’s 
                                                           
1 Kemahlıoğlu and Sayarı, (2011) and Turan, (1985) provide extensive empirical 
evidence on party switching in Turkey. 
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leverage in negotiations. Moreover, almost one third of SHP deputies defected to CHP 
in 1992 and 1993. This diminished SHP’s power to pass legislation to which DYP had 
already been opposing (SHP Parti Đçi Eğitim Semineri, 1993, pp. 11-12). Through all of 
these, party switching affected not only formation and functioning, but also the stability 
of the Turkish coalition governments in the 1990s.  
Another characteristic of the Turkish party system which had implications for the 
coalition behavior was polarization. During the 1990s, the electorate disillusioned with 
the government parties gradually moved away from the center to the right. This 
transformation reverberated in the rising conservative tendencies characterized by 
elements of nationalism and political Islam (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; 2009). 
The previous type of polarization during the 1970s was based on the left-right cleavage, 
and it was moderated in 1990s in response to global developments. However, cleavages 
based on ethnic nationalism and the pro-Islamist versus secularist divide deepened. RP 
emerged as a far-right party with an alleged anti-systemic discourse during the mid-
1990s, and came first in the 1995 elections.  
In fragmented party systems, parties tend to prioritize electoral considerations 
over policies, and the bargaining environment is destabilized with the continuous 
tendency to renegotiate the coalition arrangements (Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 158). 
However, in many multipolar party systems in Europe, such as the Netherlands and 
Finland, the dominant parties maintained their electoral strength in consecutive 
elections thereby limiting the destabilizing effect of fragmentation (Andeweg, 2000). 
Therefore, it became possible to form alternating coalitions including the dominant 
party. As mentioned before, the Turkish case was different though (Sayarı, 2007). In the 
absence of a dominant party, the bargaining environment tends to be more complex 
with a high number of parties. An anti-system party; on the other hand, is considered to 
be a destabilizing factor in the party system in general (Sartori, 1976). The existence of 
an anti-system party diminished the number of feasible government formulas as other 
parties refrained from coalescing with those parties, such as the communist parties of 
the Cold War (e.g. in Belgium, Italy and Austria), popular protest parties in Sweden and 
Norway, and, far-right parties in France, Italy and Belgium (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 
569). Nevertheless, in some instances, parties also united against the anti-system parties 
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(Budge and Keman, 1993), and this ameliorated the confrontational bargaining 
environment (Warwick, 1994, p. 14). In the Turkish case, it is debatable whether there 
was an anti-system party. On the one hand, RP’s landslide victory in the 1995 elections 
created the concern for many people that the party might be a threat to secular 
democracy. As a consequence, civil society groups as well as other political actors put 
pressure on the two major center right parties, ANAP and DYP, to form a coalition 
government although the two parties had persistently refrained from joining together in 
a government between 1991 and 1995.2 In spite of these efforts, the centrist parties did 
not treat RP as an anti-system party they would never ally with. ANAP called off a 
cabinet with RP in the last minute (Şanlıtürk, 2004, 34-35), while the RP-DYP 
government under Erbakan lasted nearly a year. Similarly, this government was often 
characterized by compromise and retreat (Altunışık and Tür, 2005), which may not be 
expected from a genuine anti-system party. Nevertheless, the rise of RP created concern 
in the public opinion. This put pressure on the secularist parties in their communication 
with RP for prospective coalition arrangements. In this context, these characteristics of 
the Turkish party system during the 1990s increased uncertainty and mistrust first in the 
processes of coalition building, and then during the functioning of the governments. Its 
major impact was mostly in the form of bargaining failures between parties with similar 
policy platforms, and the prioritization of electoral considerations over policies in the 
absence of a dominant party. 
 
 
 
3.2. Formal and Informal Constraints on the Coalition Governments 
 
 
 
A constraint refers to any restriction on the behavior of political parties and their 
leaders during coalition bargaining processes beyond their short-term control (Strøm, 
Budge, and Laver, 1994, p. 308). The constraints encroach upon government formation 
as they limit the set of feasible coalitions through the constitution and electoral laws. 
                                                           
2 The desire for a ANAP-DYP coalition has been salient in the newspapers in the 
aftermath of the 1995 elections. A notable business organization, TÜSĐAD sent a page-
long advertisement to the mainstream daily newspapers to encourage the two parties of 
the center-right for building a coalition government (Yalansız, 2006, p. 466). 
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Moreover, the rules pertaining to governance and termination phases also influence the 
actors’ decisions in the bargaining process since they would try to avoid forging 
coalitions that would be relatively fragile in the long-term. In the Turkish case, there 
were both formal (institutional) and informal (extra-parliamentary) constraints. 
However, most of the time, they intertwined with each other.  
Constitutions have been and still are the main documents which depict the basic 
institutional rules pertaining to government formation and functioning in Western 
European democracies as well as in Turkey. In the European democratic process, a head 
of state appoints a party leader to form the government; it does not matter if the head of 
state is a monarch or the president of the republic. Indeed, this is a ceremonial power in 
many parliamentary systems. Although heads of state usually appoint the leader of the 
largest party in the parliament (Andeweg, 2000), in some countries, presidents have far-
reaching prerogatives in government formation. For instance, in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Finland, heads of state appoint a formateur and/or informateur (De 
Winter, 1995, p. 123). The main difference between a party leader who is appointed to 
form the government in other countries and a formateur/informateur is that while the 
former simply pursues his own parties’ interests, the latter has a responsibility to craft 
optimal coalition arrangements acceptable to all sides (Martin and Vanberg, 2003). In 
Finland, the head of state also has the right to suggest a set of instructions for inter-
party negotiations (Nousiainen, 2000, p. 268). 
Article 104/b of the Turkish constitution (1982) gives the power to select the 
prospective prime minister to the president. In this respect, Turkish institutional rules 
regarding government formation are similar to the majority of European democracies. 
Most of the time, presidents appoint the leader of the largest party. However, it should 
be noted that the 1982 constitution changed the balance of powers between government 
divisions in favor of the executive branch. Relying on the extended constitutional 
prerogatives, President Demirel appointed Yılmaz rather than Çiller in 1997 after the 
RP-DYP government resigned. Moreover, it is claimed that he attempted to break RP-
DYP government up (Öke, Tirali and Akın, 2002). Certainly, these examples constitute 
a major departure from the accepted practice in parliamentary systems. There are also a 
few instances where Demirel reportedly recommended certain names for ministerial 
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posts after Prime Minister Ecevit submitted his list of names for the cabinet. For 
example, Đsmail Cem argues that although he was originally named the minister of 
culture, on Demirel’s demand he assumed the ministry of foreign affairs (Dündar, 2008, 
p. 200). In this sense, the extent of involvement of the president in the formation of 
Turkish governments is reminiscent of the Finnish, Italian and Portuguese practices 
(Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 568).  
A second institutional constraint on government formation and functioning 
pertains to the investiture requirement. In fact, an investiture requirement or vote of 
confidence is the most important institutional rule which influences coalition 
governance in Europe (Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003, p. 28). It limits alternative 
coalition arrangements, and the bargaining environment becomes more complex as the 
investiture requirement reinforces the tendency for oversize governments. For example 
in Italy, Ireland and Portugal, a government has to get a vote of confidence to be 
inaugurated. Likewise, Article 110 of the Turkish constitution establishes an investiture 
requirement for taking office. Article 175; on the other hand, adds to the weight of the 
parliamentary arithmetic by requiring qualified majorities of three-fifths and two-thirds 
for constitutional amendments. It should be noted that the requirement of qualified 
majorities in legislation is common in Europe; even in some countries like Austria and 
Finland which did not adopt investiture requirements. Investiture requirements are 
important in understanding why minority governments are rare in Turkey, although 
almost one third of governments were minority governments in other European 
countries between 1945 and 1980 (Strøm, 1984). Only 5 out of 60 governments 
between 1923 and 2010 in Turkey were minority governments, 3 of which could not get 
a vote of confidence. Parties seek majorities in forming coalitions to secure investiture, 
but they have to consider obtaining qualified ones, if they have policy provisions that 
might require constitutional amendment.  
Institutional rules emphasize the importance of the parliamentary strength of the 
government vis-á-vis the opposition. However, the parliamentary arithmetic is shaped 
by the electoral system, which is depicted in the 1983 Parliamentary Election Law. 
According to Article 33, parties have to pass the 10 percent national threshold to be 
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entitled to have seats in the parliament, making the votes-to-seats formula (d’Hondt)3 
privilege larger parties. As such, the electoral system limits the number of parties that 
can enter the parliament. Moreover, smaller parties opt for pre-election alliances. This 
also adds to the complexities of the bargaining environment. For instance, because 
some HEP deputies entered the parliament on the lists of SHP in the 1991 elections, 
some DYP deputies and provincial branches hesitated to form a DYP-SHP coalition 
government (Milliyet, 23.10.1991). Likewise, the nationalist-Islamist BBP competed 
under ANAP in the 1995 elections. They bolstered conservative tendencies within 
ANAP towards forming a government with RP (Kara, 2007, p. 234). Finally, the 
Political Parties Law of 1983 in Turkey determined the kind of parties that can be 
formed, and the conditions for banning parties from political activities. In its content 
before the amendments, Article 96 implied that the republican establishment identifies 
not only radicalism (i.e. communism and fascism), but also pro-Kurdish and pro-
Islamist parties as a threat to political system.  
Extra-parliamentary actors including the military, the presidents and the business 
circles declare their preferences in the government formation phases in a similar way. 
Among the extra-parliamentary actors, the military may be identified as the most 
influential institution in Turkey with regard to coalition politics. Those who emphasize 
the role of military in politics argue that the threat of a coup develops an understanding 
of permissible actions and behavior (Çarkoğlu, 1998; Ahmad, 1993, p. 137). However, 
apart from the exception of the February 28 process in 1997,4 whether the military 
establishment had direct impact on government formation and functioning in the 1990s 
or not is questionable. In my interviews, respondents who served in the ANAP-DYP, 
                                                           
3 The d’Hondt is a method used in list proportional systems to allocate the seats to the 
parties on the basis of their vote shares. Accordingly, seats are first distributed to parties 
on the basis of a set of divisors. For the calculation of seats on the basis of this formula, 
please see Lijphart and Aitkin (1994, p. 153). 
4 The February 28 Process refers to the period that began with a National Security 
Council meeting on February 28, 1997. In this meeting, members of the military 
identified the rise of political Islam as one of the leading threats to the regime, accused 
the RP-DYP government of encouraging reactionary activities and outlined a set of 
policy suggestions to be applied by the current as well as prospective governments. 
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RP-DYP5 and the ANAP-DSP-DTP cabinets referred to the role of the military in the 
formation of the governments with varying degrees of emphasis. A former minister 
from RP identified the pressures from the military establishment as the key factor which 
deterred ANAP from a coalition with their party.6 Respondents from ANAP also 
confirmed this to  be a key factor.7 Another minister from the ANAP-DSP-DTP cabinet 
argued that they formed this government so that the democratic regime would not be 
interrupted.8 Having said that, it should be noted that the overall analysis of the 
interviews indicates the role of the Turkish military during the formation of 
governments in the mid-1990s to be relatively indirect. The fact that skepticism of the 
military towards RP was salient played a powerful role in the perception of the leaders 
in terms of the permissive coalitions. As a notable minister of the period states: “No one 
from the military directly contacted me, but a number of my close friends have been 
warning me to refrain from a coalition with RP on the basis of potential reaction from 
the army.”9 In this context, even if the military wanted its preferences for coalition 
alternatives to be considered, the leading figures did not directly interfere. Instead, they 
relied on the politicians and civil society groups to exclude RP. It was also argued that 
it was rather through President Demirel that the military’s discontent and the popular 
skepticism against RP were finally taken into consideration (Donat, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
5 Despite the alleged pressures from the pro-secular actors, DYP had to join a 
government with RP as Erbakan threatened to table new motions in the parliament 
referring to corruption charges against DYP’s leader, Çiller (Öke, Tirali and Akın, 
2002). 
6 Interview on April 8, 2011. 
7 Interviews on April 22 and May 6, 2011. 
8 Interview on April 27, 2011. 
9 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
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3.3. Patterns of Coalition Government Formation and Bargaining 
 
 
 
In the formation of governments, parties consider a number of factors. They aim 
to secure substantial support in the parliament to start with. However, as Riker (1962, p. 
33) notes “… they seek to maximize only up to the point of subjective certainty of 
winning.” In the 1990s, two out of the seven coalition governments (of DYP in 1996 
and DSP in 1999) were minority coalitions, only one of which could take office. Two 
governments formed by DYP were minimal winning coalition governments while the 
rest were oversize or surplus majority governments (Table 3.2.). This was mainly due to 
the investiture requirement of the Turkish constitution which encouraged the parties for 
seeking larger majorities as a precaution against parliamentary defeat. 
Table 3.2. Coalition Governments 
Government Party Composition 
Type of 
Government 
#r of Seats in 
the 
Parliament* 
(49) VII. Demirel gov't  I. DYP-SHP surplus majority 266 
(50) I. Çiller gov't II. DYP-SHP minimal winning  235 
(52) III. Çiller gov't DYP-CHP minimal winning  243 
(53) II. Yılmaz gov't ANAP-DYP minority coalition 261 
(54) Erbakan gov't RP-DYP surplus majority 293 
(55) III. Yılmaz gov't ANAP-DSP-DTP minority coalition 204 
(57) IV. Ecevit gov't DSP-MHP-ANAP surplus majority 352 
* Party Switching in Turkey Dataset  (Kemahlıoğlu and Sayarı, 2011). 
 
The academic literature on coalition governments also pays special attention to 
the ideological distance between parties (Axelrod, 1970; Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 
151). When we look at the Turkish case, we see that throughout the 1990s, political 
parties were located in the policy space with respect to the ethnicity cleavage and the 
secular versus pro-Islamist divide. These cleavages could also be evaluated as partial 
surrogates of the left-right divide (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). Hence, only two 
governments, DYP-ANAP and RP-DYP, were formed by parties on the same side of 
the left-right cleavage.  
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The characteristics of a coalition cabinet are influenced by whether the parties 
value being in the government. The oversize cabinets are more likely to emerge when 
the actors in general desire to join the government, which is the case in Turkey. Despite 
minor groups of dissidents, parties generally wanted to be in the government whenever 
it was possible in the 1990s. Two factors seem to increase the value of incumbency. 
First, opposition parties in Turkey had very little influence on governmental decisions 
as the incumbent parties did not necessarily seek their consent once they secured the 
necessary majority status. Second, incumbency through controlling ministries provided 
discretionary access to public resources in many countries (Druckman and Warwick, 
2005). In the 1990s, privatization was more limited in Turkey compared to today, and 
the state owned more economic ventures. In other words, there were more public 
economic enterprises under the purview of certain ministries.10 This meant more pork-
barrel opportunities and more potential for patronage and corruption. Combination of 
these two factors meant that parties which stay in opposition may face the risk of 
erosion, since they cannot vocalize the demands of their voters and distribute pork-
barrel. A respondent refers to this point as “The wide range of economic opportunities 
emanating from having a seat in the cabinet is very attractive. Only those who are not 
on good terms with the leaders may abstain knowing that chances for being in the 
cabinet are very low, but those voices are generally ignored.”11  
Nevertheless, some parties refrained from joining the government from time to 
time. CHP, for instance, refrained from joining ANAP-DSP-DTP coalition. Strøm 
(2007, p. 792) argues that parties may refrain from becoming government members 
where a previous government is terminated by a critical event, electoral volatility is 
high; and, an early election seems a close possibility. The CHP example might be 
explained by the following factors as well. The RP-DYP government had come to an 
end by the February 28 Process and the political agenda was very turbulent. Both DSP 
and ANAP wanted to include CHP in the government to form a grand coalition after a 
quasi-coup. However, CHP devised its strategy on a potential negative effect of 
incumbency on the electoral outcomes, hoping that voters disappointed with DSP in 
                                                           
10 Interview on April 6, 2011.  
11 Interview on April 6, 2011. 
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such a government would prefer CHP instead.12 In that period, polls indicated that DSP 
might not make it over the electoral threshold; hence, the CHP leader might have 
counted on its influence on DSP voters to vote strategically for the next party on the left 
of the center. It is also argued that the DSP leader wanted to include CHP in the 
government to share the responsibilities for the same reason.13 CHP’s support party 
status in this respect resembles the Greens who preferred to remain as support parties 
both in New Zealand and Sweden (Bale and Bergman, 2006; Bale and Dann, 2002).  
In the Turkish case, the existence of a party persistently in support status 
emphasizes the importance of the electoral system and the party system for who gets in 
the government. The characteristics of the party system further conditioned decisions of 
the political actors extensively. Similar to DSP and CHP, DYP and ANAP tried to 
avoid joining the same government as much as they could, not only in the ANAP-DSP-
DTP government, but also throughout the entire period. This pattern was not unique to 
the 1990s. In the 1960s, smaller parties refrained from coalescing into larger parties 
with similar policy platforms, as the credit for success would be claimed by larger 
parties (Sayarı, 1980, pp.169-171). Moreover, their deputies could switch to the larger 
party which, in turn, could result in an eventual disappearance from politics.  
 
 
 
3.3.1. Bargaining 
 
 
Bargaining is central for understanding coalition governments, as they are 
agreements reached after quite long negotiations, during which the parties give up on 
some of their demands and maintain others in order to devise a common policy 
program. As coalition governments are formed and maintained by multiple actors, 
bargaining is a continuous process starting from the government formation phase until 
its termination. Political parties bargain over government membership, policy programs 
and coalition payoffs. Parties negotiate policies and communicate during crises after a 
                                                           
12 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
13 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
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cabinet takes office. Governments come to an end when they cannot further bargain on 
a certain issue. In other words, government survival depends on successful bargaining.  
In some countries such as Italy and Sweden and to a lesser extent Norway and 
Denmark, government formation is more regulated (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 567) 
than in most European countries including Turkey. Neither the constitution, nor any 
other legal documents provides specific rules or mechanisms pertaining to government 
formation or bargaining in Turkey, except the investiture requirement. There are pre-
election pacts in some countries, which set rules for the actual bargaining process after 
a general election. In Turkey; on the other hand, pre-election alliances were made 
between the parties mostly in the form of smaller party candidates competing in the 
elections on the lists of the larger parties. Such alliances were specific to the 1990s 
since an absence of an electoral threshold did not require such alliances in the 1960s or 
1970s. The pre-election pacts of this period were also quite different from the vocal and 
publicized pacts such as German Koalitionsaussagen (Decker and Best, 2010), being 
instead rather semi-concealed election alliances. In the 1991 elections, RP, MÇP and 
IDP made a pact under RP, while HEP and SHP made another one on the left. Although 
it was not made public, and its existence was denied from time to time, SHP and HEP 
signed a secret election protocol for determining the number of candidates in the 
southeast and eastern Anatolia for each party, agreeing that they would not reject the 
names identified by the other side (Sevinç, 2000, pp. 295-298). In the 1995 elections, 
the BBP candidates competed on the ANAP lists and the SĐP candidates competed on 
the HADEP lists. These were again electoral alliances rather than pacts. Aside from 
these examples, review of the newspaper coverage indicates that a number of parties 
may have carried out negotiations before the elections or during the term of another 
cabinet for prospective options. There were two examples in this respect. DYP may be 
communicating with RP while the DYP-CHP was still in power in 1995.14 A 
                                                           
14 A newspaper footage argued that Baykal threatened to resign from the cabinet on the 
basis of increased rumours with respect to a prospective coalition between DYP and 
RP. “Hükümeti Bozarım”, Milliyet, 20.11.1995.  
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rapprochement between DSP and ANAP was signaled even before the 1995 elections.15 
This rapprochement was also confirmed by the respondents from the two parties in the 
interviews.16 As mentioned before, none of these were in the form of a series of 
bargaining processes in which the coalition agreement was designed before the 
elections and realized in its aftermath. 
In the absence of the institutional mechanisms and rules, as well as explicit pre-
election coalition pacts, government formation and bargaining is largely shaped by 
informal rules and practices as well as personal contributions, referred to as “free-style 
bargaining between elites” (Laver and Schofield, 1998). In my research, I searched for 
bargaining patterns and characteristics in in-depth interviews, secondary sources such 
as memoirs, and I also reviewed newspapers from the coalition government years of the 
1990s. 
Firstly, although government formation required the legal appointment of a party 
leader by the president to start negotiations, bargaining has been mostly informal in the 
Turkish context. Although there is no legal informateur position, Hüsamettin Özkan’s 
role in the negotiations before the ANAP-DSP-MHP coalition and the DSP minority 
government were formed resembled that of an informateur. He went back and forth 
between a number of parties so as to identify potential points of agreement and 
prospective coalitions. During the formation of ANAP-DSP-MHP government, the 
main purpose was to build a viable government formula which would exclude RP and 
function smoothly. During the formation of the DSP minority government, he mainly 
intended to get the support of ANAP and DYP to prevent lingering of bargaining 
processes and install a government in a short-time to restore the stability in the political 
system.17   Secondly, although the leaders needed the authorization of the central 
executive boards of the parties to start coalition talks, this did not mean that the issues 
                                                           
15 In a press statement, Yılmaz mentioned that the leader of DSP was positive for a 
coalition after the elections. “Mesut Yılmaz’ın Seçim Sonrası Planı: Çiller’siz 
Birleşme”, Milliyet, 06.12.1995. 
16 Interviews on April 22 and May 3, 2011. 
17 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
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were widely discussed within the parties, no matter whether a party was appointed for 
government formation or was just a prospective smaller coalition partner. For example, 
Sevinç (2000, p. 48) argues that only Erdal Đnönü and Hikmet Çetin knew the content of 
the secret protocol between SHP and HEP. This might also be explained with the 
absence of an intraparty democracy to a certain extent. As the examples suggest, 
coalition bargaining has been mostly conducted during the talks between the inner 
circles of the parties in communication.  
When a party was expected to preside over government, a small group of top 
party executives, usually of three or four people, started to discuss the prospects. 
Among these circles, some figures (such as Hikmet Çetin from SHP, Mustafa Kalemli 
from ANAP, and of course Hüsamettin Özkan from DSP) became prominent in 
coordinating talks between parties in the 1990s.18 The same groups usually designated 
their essential demands with respect to the ministries and policies. In practice, in all 
these governments, two separate teams were established once two or three parties 
decided to form a government.19 Both teams were composed of members from each 
party. The first team was the negotiation team, usually composed of the general 
secretaries and/or vice chairs in addition to the party leaders. Sides exchanged papers 
about the office and policy priorities that were prepared beforehand in their parties. 
Once they reached an agreement on these issues, a second team was formed for writing 
the coalition protocols and the government programs. This team was composed of 
politically less prominent figures who had advisory statuses in the parties, usually with 
law or academic backgrounds. On average, each team again included three or four 
members from each side. These teams were relatively small compared to the 
negotiation teams in other European countries. For example, negotiation teams were 
made up of 15-20 members in the German coalition bargaining processes (Saalfeld, 
2003, p. 47). This is re-emphasizing the decisive role of the inner circles within the 
Turkish parties.  
                                                           
18 Interviews on April 22 and 29, 2011. 
19 Interview on May 16, 2011. 
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There is a substantial debate over whether office or policy motivations prevail 
during the bargaining process ever since Riker’s (1962) pioneering research and De 
Swaan’s (1973) counter-arguments. Opponents criticize the school of thought which 
depict parties as mere office-seekers, arguing that there is no conclusive empirical 
evidence in support of this claim, and add that office-seeking parties also consider 
policies through controlling relevant ministries, even if the ultimate aim is to impress 
voters (Budge and Keman, 1993). However, the presence of patronage or clientelism in 
the form of distribution of public resources in exchange for votes (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007, p. 86), might lead parties to act as office-seekers rather than policy-
seekers. This, for instance, explains why parties behave as office-seekers in Iceland, 
although they tend to prioritize policy considerations in other Nordic countries 
(Indridason, 2005, p. 462).  
The research on the Turkish coalition governments in the 1990s provided 
supporting evidence in this regard. Coalition bargaining in the 1990s seems to have 
taken place mostly for the offices, and there was relatively less debate on policies and 
programs in the negotiation teams’ talks. This might partly be related to the fact that 
patronage was a characteristic feature of Turkish politics (Sayarı 1977; Kalaycıoğlu, 
2001), which was probably the main factor that had prevented the parties from focusing 
mainly on policies (Heper and Başkan, 2001, p. 82). Heper and Keyman (1998, p. 259) 
further argue that even when policy considerations came to the forefront, they were not 
devoid of electoral prospects. The office dimension of the negotiations was a recurrent 
theme in the interviews as well. Interestingly, although the question pertaining to the 
coalition talks did not include any specific reference to the distribution of cabinet posts 
(Appendix 2), the respondents cited policy issues very rarely with the possible 
exceptions of the bargaining processes on the eve of the I. DYP-SHP and DSP-MHP-
ANAP governments. DYP and SHP’s main motivation to coalesce after the 1991 
elections, as explicitly written in the coalition agreement and the government program, 
was to erase the ramifications of the 1980 coup and its “collaborator” ANAP’s policies. 
Both parties had similar emphases on democratization and social welfare in their 
election manifestos. In the case of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, both parties 
sought conciliation over the law on the status of the state security courts, discrimination 
in the public sphere and Quran courses in the summer months for students past than the 
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fifth grade (Tutar, 2006, p. 419). This was probably an initiative from the MHP side as 
it was the first time they joined a government, and they felt the need to act in advance 
as they knew that these issues would be on the political agenda. Other than the office-
motivations, another reason as to why there was relatively less debate on policies in the 
bargaining process might be the declining salience of the left-right cleavage globally as 
often referred to in the interviews. However, this does not explain why DYP and RP or 
ANAP and RP did not have much controversy over the policy differences despite the 
rise and sharpening of the secular versus pro-Islamist cleavage in the 1990s. Thus, it 
might not be unrealistic to claim that another consideration was to speed up the 
bargaining process, and leave the policy debates to the later stages of governance.   
As far as bargaining for coalition payoffs is considered, parties, as expected, 
negotiated with certain ministries and the deputies they nominated for the cabinet. In 
the Turkish Council of Ministers, there have been both state ministries and investor 
ministries (“yatırımcı bakanlıklar”). The negotiation teams first bargained over the 
distribution of investor ministries. Then, the state ministries were allocated. At this 
stage, parties tried to make the total distribution of ministries more or less in proportion 
to the seat shares of the parties. In terms of the investor ministries, two motivations 
seem to govern the bargaining process: the redistributive capacity and the size of the 
staff. More ideological or programmatic parties such as MHP, RP and SHP tended to 
insist on getting the ministry of education. MHP and RP were the successors of other 
nationalist and pro-Islamist parties respectively. In the 1960s and 1970s, when these 
parties were in governments, they became notorious for colonizing the ministries for 
ideological reasons. For this reason, their partners tended to insist on keeping the 
ministry of education under control.20 In the case of the I.DYP-SHP government, SHP 
was concerned about DYP’s candidate for the ministry of education and gave up on this 
ministry only after DYP reassured SHP’s worries by promising to appoint Köksal 
Toptan, a more moderate and liberal candidate. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP 
government’s formation process, this ministry became more important as an extension 
of the compulsory education to eight years was on the agenda. This change was 
designated previously in the National Security Council decisions during the February 
                                                           
20 Interview on April 29, 2011. 
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28 process in 1997. Therefore, in addition to the colonization worries, DSP insisted on 
keeping the ministry of education under its control to oversee its implementation.21 The 
ministry of education also had material value, given that it had vast personnel which 
could be used by the parties to provide job opportunities to their supporters and garner 
votes in the next elections.  
For the rest of the ministries in this period, clientelist motivations were also at 
work. In this respect, the state ministries which controlled the administration of the 
economy and certain banks such as Vakıfbank, Halkbankası, Ziraat Bankası and Emlak 
Bankası, as well as the ministries of finance and health had been subject to fierce 
controversy in the bargaining rounds. The ministry of agriculture and rural affairs had 
also been critical as it has had potential to increase votes in rural areas through 
distributing subsidies. Nevertheless, it should be noted that DSP refrained from 
assuming any of these ministries. They were prone to patronage, DSP did not want to 
face corruption allegations. A former cabinet member from ANAP recited this point as 
“Ecevit openly said that he did not want to get any of the investor ministries. He said 
that there was too much speculation in the public opinion about these ministries and that 
he did not want to be accused of corruption”.22 The ministry of the interior, along with 
the ministry of education; on the other hand, seems to have more policy value. The 
ministry of the interior was responsible for internal security and order, and its 
importance further increased in the 1990s as political violence escalated.  
In the distribution of coalition payoffs, getting more “valuable” ministries 
indicated whether bargaining power between the parties was dispersed or concentrated 
in the hands of a party. As in the coalition governments of 1960s and 1970s (Sayarı 
1980, p. 236), larger parties tended to get more critically important ministries in the 
1990s. Larger parties almost always got the ministry of the interior as it was the most 
critical ministry of the time. There were two exceptions to this trend. In the RP-DYP 
government, presumably in order to avoid potential opposition from the military 
establishment, the president and other hard-liner secularist social actors, DYP rather 
                                                           
21 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
22 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
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than RP assumed it.23 In the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, although ANAP was the 
smallest party, it took control of the ministry of the interior. On behalf of MHP, this 
was reasoned with the party’s over-sensitive electoral base; thus, they did not want to 
be in the position of controlling the ministry in charge of security and order in case they 
would be perceived as failing to maintain the peace.24 The motivations of DSP were 
less clear. It has been argued that DSP was also concerned with electoral punishment 
since it was not known if the capture of Abdullah Öcalan would put an end to the terror. 
Moreover, allegedly the DSP leadership did not trust their deputies’ competence in the 
area.25  
Larger parties controlled some other ministries such as the ministries of finance 
and energy, which had office-related values. Again in terms of both ministries, DSP 
was an exception presumably for the reasons mentioned above. A comparison of the 
trends in the distribution of critical ministries by decade reveals that the economic and 
political value of the ministries changed over time. Sayarı (1980, p. 236) states the 
importance of the ministries of foreign affairs and national defense among the offices 
larger parties insisted on getting, while they voluntarily gave the ministries of health 
and public works to the smaller parties in the previous decades of coalition 
governments. However, in the 1990s, the ministry of the interior became more 
important at the expense of national defense, and the strengthening of the office of 
prime ministry decreased the value of the foreign ministry. Ministries of health and 
public works, on the other hand, became important for pork-barrel opportunities. 
                                                           
23 Interview on April 6, 2011. 
24 Interview on April 29, 2011. 
25 Interview on May 3, 2011. 
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Table 3.3.1. Distribution of Coalition Payoffs 
Cabinet PM Deputy PM Justice Defense Interior Foreign Finance 
Public 
Works 
Education Health 
(49)I.DYP-SHP DYP SHP SHP DYP DYP SHP DYP SHP DYP DYP 
(50)II.DYP-SHP DYP SHP SHP DYP DYP SHP DYP SHP DYP DYP 
(52)DYP-CHP DYP CHP DYP DYP DYP CHP DYP CHP DYP DYP 
(53)ANAP-DYP ANAP DYP DYP ANAP ANAP DYP ANAP ANAP DYP DYP 
(54)RP-DYP RP DYP RP DYP DYP DYP RP RP DYP DYP 
(55)ANAP-DSP-DTP ANAP DSP-DTP ANAP DTP ANAP DSP DSP ANAP DSP ANAP 
(57)DSP-MHP-ANAP DSP DSP-MHP-ANAP DSP MHP ANAP DSP ANAP MHP DSP MHP 
                      
Table 3.3.2. Distribution of Coalition Payoffs (continued)   
Cabinet Transport 
Agriculture and 
Rural 
Labor and 
Social 
Security 
Industry Energy Culture Tourism Forestry Environment   
(49)I.DYP-SHP DYP DYP SHP SHP DYP SHP SHP DYP DYP   
(50)II.DYP-SHP DYP DYP SHP SHP DYP SHP SHP DYP DYP   
(52)DYP-CHP DYP DYP CHP CHP DYP CHP CHP DYP DYP   
(53)ANAP-DYP DYP DYP ANAP DYP ANAP ANAP DYP DYP ANAP   
(54)RP-DYP DYP DYP RP DYP RP RP DYP DYP RP   
(55)ANAP-DSP-DTP DTP ANAP DSP DSP ANAP DSP ANAP ANAP ANAP   
(57)DSP-MHP-ANAP MHP MHP ANAP MHP ANAP DSP ANAP DSP DSP   
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Bargaining processes generally produced an equilibrium on the basis of a 
principle of heterogeneity (Tables 3.3.1. and 3.3.2.). As a rule, whenever the larger 
party got the ministry of interior, the smaller party assumed the ministry of foreign 
affairs. However, it should be noted that as prime ministers already supervised the 
foreign policy, this ministry did not have much autonomous jurisdiction and power. 
Given that the military was a relevant actor in the 1990s; those ministries that attended 
National Security Council meetings had relatively more political importance for the 
parties. Until 2001, only the prime minister, ministries of the interior, foreign affairs 
and national defense had the right to be present at these meetings. Therefore, despite the 
fact that power of the ministry of foreign affairs for distribution patronage might be 
relatively limited, it was still politically valuable for the parties. Although the ministry 
of the interior also assumed most of the critical areas that might concern the ministry of 
national defense, this ministry was also important for the same reason. In principle, the 
ministries of national defense and justice were divided up between different parties. The 
only exception was the DYP-CHP government formed by DYP and CHP. The 
heterogeneity principle had also been practiced in the ministries of industry versus 
energy and tourism versus environment.  
Table 3.4. provides a summary of the bargaining processes of the Turkish 
coalitions in the 1990s. The fourth column shows the number of days that passed 
between the resignation of one cabinet and taking office of the next one. More than one 
party leader assumed the mission to build coalition in this period. The last column 
shows the bargaining duration since the leader who formed the new cabinet was 
appointed. A comparison of the two columns reveals that whenever they were not 
identical, the bargaining processes had been unsuccessful and governments were 
formed with difficulty. The table implies that government formation was particularly 
difficult and bargaining had become a daunting task between the parties in mid-1990s. 
During the negotiations for the DYP-CHP government, ANAP was becoming a viable 
option. However, DYP was reluctant to form a coalition with this party as they shared 
similar electoral base, and leaders of the two parties had personal conflict. CHP did not 
have another potential partner; however, CHP deputies had problematic relations with 
DYP during the previous governments. The two parties agreed to form a government on 
the condition of an early election to be held as soon as possible. The fact that allocation 
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of the cabinet posts remained more or less the same with the two previous governments 
implied that it was rather the policy differences and personal conflict that prolonged 
formation of the government. The ANAP-DYP government could only be formed after 
three inconclusive bargaining rounds presided by three different party leaders. Both 
governments communicated with RP, however, the political agenda of the time forced 
them to coalesce together instead.  
Table 3.4. Government Formation 
Government 
Effective 
Number of 
Parties* 
Number of 
Previous 
Bargaining 
Rounds** 
Number of 
Days Required 
for Government 
Formation*** 
Number of Days 
Required for 
Current 
Government's 
Formation**** 
I.DYP-SHP 4.68 0 13 13 
II.DYP-SHP 4.68 0 12 12 
DYP-CHP 4.68 0 39 12 
ANAP-DYP 6.15 3 56 32 
RP-DYP 6.15 0 21 21 
ANAP-DSP-DTP 6.15 0 10 10 
DSP-MHP-ANAP 6.78 0 25 25 
  
   
  
* Effective number of parties is calculated on the basis of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) 
** Including formation attempts by other party leaders 
*** It is measured as the time elapsed since the previous cabinet dissolved and a new 
one took office legally  
**** It is measured as the time elapsed between the president's appointing the party 
leader who formed the current government 
 
 
There was an increased level of party system fragmentation in this period. The 
negotiations for the RP-DYP government took relatively shorter. On the one hand, DYP 
and RP had negotiations before the ANAP-DYP government was formed. Thus, we 
might assume that they were familiar with demands of each other. On the other hand, a 
government with RP was the only remaining alternative for DYP at that time. Shortest 
bargaining process was of the ANAP-DSP-DTP government. This was not only due to 
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the absence of other options, but also because the leaders of these parties in a way felt 
the need to coalesce immediately for maintaining the democratic order.26 
 
Table 3.5. Proportionality in Coalition Payoffs 
  #umber of the Seats (a) #umber of Offices (b) b/a 
I. DYP-SHP 
  
  
DYP 178 21 0.12 
SHP 88 13 0.15 
II. DYP-SHP 
  
  
DYP 181 21 0.12 
SHP 54 14 0.26 
DYP-CHP 
  
  
DYP 183 23 0.13 
CHP 60 12 0.20 
A#AP-DYP 
  
  
ANAP  126 16 0.13 
DYP 135 18 0.13 
RP-DYP 
  
  
RP  158 19 0.12 
DYP 135 19 0.14 
A#AP-DSP-DTP* 
  
  
ANAP 129 21 0.16 
DSP 68 12 0.18 
DTP 7 6 0.86 
DSP-MHP-A#AP   
DSP 136 16 0.12 
MHP 130 13 0.10 
ANAP 86 13 0.15 
Sources:  Party Switching in Turkey Dataset (Kemahlıoğlu and Sayarı, 2011); Turkish Statistical 
Institute 
*There is one office assumed by an extra-parliamentary minister. 
** Including the posts of PM and deputy PM 
 
Bargaining processes also reflected the distribution of bargaining power among 
parties in the 1990s. Bargaining power refers to parliamentary strength as well as the 
                                                           
26 Interviews on April 22 and 27, 2011.  
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position of the party in the political space (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 7). In the 
coalition governments, a general trend was proportionality which means that there 
exists a ratio between the seat share of a party in the cabinet and the number of offices it 
controls (Warwick and Druckman, 2001). A high correlation between the portfolio 
shares of the parties and the share they got from an allocation of the ministries indicates 
that proportionality was applied. It should be noted though, that small-parties tend to be 
privileged, which is referred to as small-party bias in the literature (Browne and 
Franklin, 1973). In the Turkish case, pairwise correlations between the parties’ shares 
of the seats with respect to their share in the cabinet between 1991 and 2002 yields 
insignificant results (p=0.0756). In other words, coalition payoffs in the Turkish 
governments of 1990s were allocated so that small parties controlled more ministries 
than their parliamentary strength suggested (Table 3.5.). Presumably, this stemmed 
from the fact that the political situation was very turbulent, and options were limited. In 
other words, viable coalition partners were few and thus the walk away value of the 
smaller parties was higher. Walk away value basically refers to situations in which 
options are very limited and some parties have less to lose from termination of the 
negotiations (Lupia and Strøm, 2008, p. 63).  
In the 1991-1995 period, in the governments between DYP and SHP/CHP, the 
number of the seats of DYP was twice as much as SHP/CHP’s: In the I. DYP-SHP 
government, DYP had 178 while SHP had 88 members in the parliament. In the II. 
DYP-SHP government, seats of DYP rose to 181 while SHP’s seats declined to 54. 
With the switching of deputies from SHP to CHP after CHP reopened, the ratio of the 
seats of the government parties increased to three times. SHP’s number of ministries 
was disproportionately higher than its parliamentary strength. However, there were no 
other viable partners for DYP. ANAP was still seen as the representative of the 
September 12 regime within DYP, and governance problems between DYP and 
SHP/CHP had not yet come to the brink of deadlock and had not yet forced DYP to 
reconsider the ANAP option despite its drawbacks. In the governments between ANAP 
and DYP, as well as RP and DYP, proportionality norm more or less held. In this 
period, all three parties had the potential to preside by government formation, thus, each 
had similar bargaining power which reflected on the allocation of the cabinet posts. In 
the ANAP-DSP-DTP government, the minor DTP was highly favored because ANAP 
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and DSP could not secure a parliamentary majority, they had barely convinced CHP to 
support them from the outside, and this made DTP a key actor in the negotiations. In the 
only coalition government after the 1999 elections, ANAP disproportionately benefited 
from the office allocation mainly at the expense of MHP, which was probably the result 
of the lack of experience of the nationalist’s negotiation team. 
 
 
 
3.4. Coalition Governance 
 
 
 
Similar to government formation, there are no rules or institutions in Turkey 
pertaining specifically to coalition governance. However, the main institution for 
devising and enforcing government policies is the Council of Ministers headed by the 
Prime Minister. The framework of the cabinet has been devised and regulated by two 
laws (Law on the Establishment of Ministeries, Nr. 3046 and Law on the Office of 
Prime Minister, Nr. 3056) in accordance with the 1982 constitution. Over time, the 
jurisdiction and power of the prime ministry strengthened and expanded. Moreover, an 
article was added putting the ministries under the purview of the prime ministry. In 
addition to these characteristics of governance, as the head of the executive branch, the 
President had the veto power over legislation.  
In the 1990s, there were three important aspects of coalition governance: the 
relations between the prime minister and the president, the nature of the coalition 
protocols and relations between the larger and smaller partners of the government. As 
far as the first aspect was considered, uneasy relations between the government and the 
president have had limited effect on the functioning of governments. It displayed its 
influence usually in the form of vetoing and returning the draft bills back for 
parliamentary revision. For instance, Özal blocked a number of DYP-SHP bills in 1992 
(Arcayürek, 2000, p. 84). Demirel also returned some bills; however, it was Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer who left his mark on this period. He returned numerous draft bills for 
reconsideration in the parliament and had tense relations with the DSP-MHP-ANAP 
government (Ahmad, 1993, p. 260). It should be noted that the influence of the returned 
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bills on governance is limited as parliament has legal power to pass a returned bill 
without revision for the second time.  
A second aspect of coalition governments regarded the coalition protocols. Since 
the end of World War II until the late 1990s, more than half of the coalition 
arrangements were codified into written agreements in Europe, and countries which did 
not have such documents adopted them (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 573). Turkey has 
been one of the few countries which always had written protocols. However, a review 
and an analysis of the coalition protocols raise questions about the reliability, validity 
and authenticity of these documents. Specifically speaking, although these documents 
have been open to public access on TBMM’s official web site, they may not be the 
authentic documents devised originally by the parties. Although interviews and 
secondary sources such as memoirs and print media mentioned certain rules and articles 
in coalition agreements, the public versions of the protocols did not include them. For 
example, in the interviews with both the ANAP and DSP sides of the DSP-MHP-ANAP 
government, it was mentioned that ANAP had to give the ministry of agriculture and 
village affairs to DSP on the condition that the village affairs branch would be 
abolished in a year and submitted to the provincial administration.27 Moreover, the 
jurisdiction domains of the state ministries were not explained in any of the protocols. 
More importantly, one minister openly admitted that there were two versions of the 
coalition protocol of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, and that portfolio allocations 
will be permanent across the entire term even if the parties’ parliamentary strength 
changed.28 All of the coalition governments in Luxembourg and Italy, and some of 
them in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Netherlands have kept their 
arrangements private (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 574). It is important to note that 
written coalition agreements might serve for reducing uncertainty and mistrust by 
laying ground rules for governance (Timmermans, 2006). However, whether they will 
make these arrangements public still remains unknown. In this respect, Turkish parties 
behaved in similar ways to their European counterparts. They had written documents, 
                                                           
27 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
28 Interview on April 26, 2011. 
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and there is no evidence that they did not commit to the articles, at least in the protocols 
which were kept private.  
Considering these aspects, it might be more convenient to discuss coalition 
governance in terms of the empirical patterns and practices rather than on the basis of 
written documents, which leads the debate to the relations between the larger and 
smaller parties in the government. There is substantial empirical evidence that the 
parties that preside over government formation have certain advantages in receiving 
office and policy payoffs (Debus, 2008; Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss, and Ting, 
2005). It is possible to assume that they have greater leverage from this perspective. 
Therefore, we might expect them to be dominant in the government with respect to 
legislation and in determining government policies. In the Turkish coalition 
governments of the 1990s, there was a similar pattern. In general, the larger party 
tended to enforce its own policy provisions whenever there was divergence between the 
government parties. There were examples which indicate that whenever the larger party 
could do something with an executive order, it did not even consult with the smaller 
partner. For instance, DYP used this strategy in the I.DYP-SHP government (Heper and 
Başkan, 2001, p. 76). In the cases where the government was not ideologically 
connected, and the larger party could not enact with executive orders, sometimes the 
party looked for the support of another party in the parliament. For instance, DYP relied 
on ANAP’s support to circumvent SHP opposition to certain laws as well as to forestall 
SHP’s draft bills (Saybaşılı, 1995, p. 52). Moreover, when the larger party needed to 
consult with the smaller party, the party leader tended to negotiate the issue with the 
other party’s leader rather than contacting the relevant minister from the other side. 
From another perspective, the behavior of the largest party was also contingent upon the 
personality of the leaders and the personal relations between the party leaders. For 
instance, while Demirel and Đnönü frequently consulted over the policies and issues, 
Çiller was notorious for being difficult to be reached by the SHP/CHP leaders and 
ministers and for giving decisions on her own. In the II.DYP-SHP and DYP-CHP 
governments led by Çiller, the SHP/CHP ministers complained about not being 
informed even when Çiller planned a cross-border operation into Syria.29 Similar 
                                                           
29 Interview on April 29, 2011. 
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problems of communication were also noted in the ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-
ANAP governments (Tutar, 2006, p. 423).  
Smaller parties tried to devise strategies to shove themselves through the Council 
of Ministers. SHP succeeded in this strategy during its first government with DYP both 
because of the good relations between Demirel and Đnönü, and it tried to coordinate 
their policies between the ministers under their control. SHP’s success in the local 
elections might have also increased its bargaining power. As SHP/CHP started to lose 
its power at the local level and party leaderships changed in mid-1992, it adopted 
another strategy. It tried to convince the larger partner to make certain changes in the 
draft bills in exchange for granting support. This was a common strategy on talks about 
privatization. In other cases, it tried to negotiate the voting of two draft bills 
simultaneously. For example, privatization with the democratization package, in an 
attempt to make sure that if the DYP deputies wanted to pass legislation they would 
also have to pass the SHP draft (Milliyet, 24.10.1994). DSP followed a similar strategy 
in the ANAP-DSP-DTP government. ANAP; on the other hand, tried to use personal 
relations with the key coordinator from DSP (Hüsamettin Özkan) in the DSP-MHP-
ANAP government. Whenever the smaller party could not devise any other strategy, it 
threatened its resignation, and this strategy worked in the lack of outside options such 
as in the second DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP and ANAP-DSP-DTP governments. The nature 
of the relations between the larger and smaller parties in the governments might be 
explained partially on the basis of the prime ministers’ institutional powers (Andeweg 
and Timmermans, 2003). In their comparative analysis of Ireland and Netherlands, 
Andeweg and Timmermans (2003) found that the internal environment of the cabinets 
was biased in favor of the larger party for this reason. The same logic might be used in 
understanding the behavior of Turkish parties in this period given that the laws 
pertaining to the prime ministry and ministries (Nos. 3046 and 3056) strengthened 
prime minister vis-à-vis the cabinet by making ministers responsible to the prime 
minister.  
Crisis and conflict management mechanisms constituted another important 
dimension of coalition governance. Three main types of crises seemed to be common in 
the governments of 1990s. The first type of crises occurred in governments formed by 
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ideologically distant parties, when some legislation attempts turned into deadlocks. For 
example, privatization and the scope of the laws on terror were the main sources of 
conflict in the II.DYP-SHP and DYP-CHP governments. First Karayalçın, then Baykal 
refused to support these laws for ideological reasons. EU harmonization reforms 
became a source of problems in the DSP-MHP-ANAP government due to MHP’s 
blockage. Yet, the biggest crisis which challenged this government was the debate on 
executing the death penalty decision of the court for the PKK leader (Akar and Dündar, 
2008, p. 473). A second and more common crisis was about signing governmental 
decrees and bureaucratic appointments such as those in II.DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP, 
ANAP-DYP, RP-DYP and ANAP-DSP-DTP governments. In the interviews, this crisis 
was frequently associated with accessing the patronage benefits. Accordingly, certain 
parties such as DYP and ANAP tried to appoint their relatives or publicly evident 
supporters in the public sector to critical bureaucratic positions. The last major 
government crisis was corruption. RP continuously tabled motions of censure against 
DYP leader, and the ANAP leader let his party group loose in the voting which turned 
into a government crisis during ANAP-DYP government (Öke, Tirali  and Akın, 2002, 
p. 138). On the other hand, there were corruption charges against several ANAP 
deputies and the party leaders, not only from DTP but also from MHP throughout the 
second half of the 1990s. The pattern of crisis indicates that electoral concerns forced 
parties to orient towards ideologically distant partners, and therefore, part of the crises 
had roots in the party system. The second aspect of the crises had roots in the political 
system as corruption allegations dominated the political agenda in this period. 
As noted earlier, coalition governments involve continuous bargaining rounds 
from their establishment to their termination. The fact that there were various crises did 
not necessarily mean that coalitions were unstable by nature. Indeed, majority party 
governments also faced several crises in the parliament, albeit of different types. 
Coalition governments usually crafted certain mechanisms to resolve their conflicts. 
The main mechanism adopted by the governments of this period in Turkey was based 
on resorting to certain key coordinators and inner cabinets. For instance, Hikmet Çetin 
from SHP and Cavit Çağlar from DYP were two deputies, who tried to maintain a 
certain level of coordination between the parties. Hüsamettin Özkan was an eminent 
figure in the 1995-2002 period. He was not only known for his role in the government 
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formation process, but also identified as the key coordinator in the governments where 
DSP was a member (Tosun, 2003, p. 49) (Kuşçuoğlu, 2001). In an interview, the former 
Minister of Public Works, Koray Aydın argued that, whenever a crisis emerged, an 
issue specific commission was formed usually under the leadership of Özkan (Akar and 
Dündar, 2008, p. 482). 
In one government, there was a variety of party summits. In the DSP-MHP-
ANAP government, the “leaders’ summit” was established. Both DSP and MHP 
claimed credit for both the crafting and the success of this mechanism. Accordingly, the 
summit would meet at least once a month convening the leaders of the three parties as 
well as one minister from each party. The leaders agreed to discuss any matter first in 
the summits before escalating the crisis to their parties.30 Moreover, all appointments 
would be made by joint decrees, and the allocation of the ministries would not be 
revised even if the seat distribution changes in the parliament (Tutar, 2006, p. 419). The 
presence of these mechanisms indicates that – contrary to the widely accepted view of 
the Turkish coalition governments as examples of discordant alliances – the parties tried 
to resolve the crises as much as possible. It was only when the relations between the 
leaders reached the level of animosity for various reasons or when they anticipated 
favorable electoral outcomes that the parties deliberately interrupted further bargaining.  
 
 
                                                           
30 Interview on April 29, 2011. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
COALITIOS AD CABIET DURABILITY, 1991-2002 
 
 
 
 
Short government life has far-reaching consequences for political systems. Such 
governments tend to have poor policy performance records (Huber, 1998, p. 588). In 
extreme cases where governments fail to survive for a considerable period of time 
repeatedly, political actors may begin to question the legitimacy of the democratic 
regime (Linz, 1978).1 Hence, understanding the sources of cabinet durability is a major 
concern in the scholarly literature. As mentioned before, coalition governments have 
commonly been associated with instability. “As with many popular misconceptions,” 
note Laver and Schofield, “this contention has an element of truth in it, but can only be 
sustained on the basis of carefully selected examples” (1998, p. 144). The authors 
continue that the critics generally refer to the countries with less durable governments 
and ignore the successful examples from other countries. Indeed, the duration of 
coalition governments varies greatly between and within governments between 
different periods of time as will be illustrated in the next chapter. The purpose of this 
chapter is to analyze the issue of cabinet durability in the coalition governments that 
were formed in Turkey between 1991 and 2002. More specifically, my goal here is to 
examine why some governments lasted for a fairly long period while others turned out 
to be short-lived.  
                                                           
1 Governments formed during the 1970s were notorious for the short duration of their 
cabinets. Hence, the leading military figures held the parliamentarians responsible for 
the turbulence and instability in the country. In his speech on national TV declaring 
martial law, Chief of Staff Kenan Evren mentioned this accusation. According to him, 
the military aimed “to place the democracy which cannot control itself on solid ground” 
[“… kendi kendini kontrol edemeyen demokrasiyi sağlam temeller üzerine oturtmak,”]. 
Available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxmeV2OyQQs> (retrieved 
20.05.2011). 
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4.1. Cabinet Duration in Turkey 
 
 
 
Many people may be ready to accept that coalition governments do not and 
cannot last for long; however, depicting even the beginning and the end of a 
government is not as straightforward as it seems (Conrad and Golder, 2010). How 
should we consider the governments formed by DYP and SHP/CHP in the early 1990s 
for example? Were they three different governments or were they different cabinets of 
the same government?2 What if the same cabinets continue to rule in consecutive inter-
election periods? There have been several attempts to define precisely the transitions 
from one government to the other (Dodd, 1976; Lijphart, 1999). The most recent studies 
consider a new government to be formed each time the set of parties that constitute the 
government or the prime minister change, or if a general election takes place (Strøm, 
Müller, and Bergman, 2008). This way, the cabinet rather than the government is 
considered to be the unit of analysis. Although estimations of cabinet duration often 
rely on average values, cabinets formed immediately after a general election – by 
definition – have higher life expectancies. A cabinet formed in the midst of the 
constitutional inter-election period (CIEP) has less time even if it rules for the entire 
period until the election. More recent studies assess the mean relative durations in 
addition to the average values to avoid this bias. The mean relative duration is 
“expressed as the percentage of the remainder of the CIEP (maximum potential 
duration)” (Saalfeld, 2008, p. 330). 
 
 
                                                           
2 The popular view of these governments might be to consider the I. DYP-SHP, II. 
DYP-SHP and DYP-CHP governments as parts of a single government. For example, a 
daily newspaper in Turkey, declared that the coalition government had been in power 
more than a thousand days, being the most durable multiparty government in the 
republican era (“Koalisyon Rekor Kırdı”, Milliyet, 31.10.1994). However, in my 
interviews, respondents from the SHP/CHP indicated that these were three distinct 
governments.  
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Table 4.1. Cabinet Duration in Turkey by decade* 
  Party Governments 
Coalition 
Governments 
  
mean 
duration 
(in days) 
mean 
relative 
duration 
(%) 
mean 
duration 
(in 
days) 
mean 
relative 
duration 
(%) 
1950-1959 732 0.61 -   
1960-1969 796 0.55 359 0.57 
1970-1979 156 0.31 488 0.44 
1980-1989 916 0.58 -   
1990-1999 104 0.18 545 0.40 
2000-2007 853 0.50 -   
Total 572 0.46 480 0.46 
  
   
  
General mean duration   532     
General mean relative duration 
  
0.46 
    
*1950-2007, excludes non-partisan cabinets 
Source Turkish Statistical Institute 
 
Since its transition to the multiparty system in 1950, Turkey had 35 
democratically elected governments, nearly 40 percent (15) of which were coalition 
governments. Majority party governments in Turkey on average lasted longer than the 
coalition governments, which is also the case in Western European democracies. 
However, when the duration relative to the remaining time until the elections is 
considered, party and coalition governments are not meaningfully different (Table 4.1.). 
To be more specific, both types of governments lasted 46 percent of their maximum 
potential duration until the next election. This stems from the fact that cabinet duration 
varies across different types of party and coalition governments as well as over time. 
Minority party governments tend to be short-lived in Turkey just like in Western 
Europe (Laver and Schofield, 1998, p. 154). However, this finding is still important 
since it confirms that Turkish coalition governments are not necessarily short-lived 
arrangements in power until majority governments are established. The dynamics of 
governance that cause variation in duration regardless of the cabinet type should be 
analyzed carefully, taking various sources of selection bias into consideration. 
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4.2. Dynamics of Cabinet Durability 
 
 
 
4.2.1. Events and Cabinet Duration 
 
 
One way of inferring the dynamics of cabinet durability is to assess the events 
that undermined a government’s functioning and the way that government ended. This 
is important not only for gaining better insight into governments’ life-cycles, but also 
because there is substantial evidence which shows that formation of a government is 
highly influenced by how the previous one ended (Damgaard, 2008, p. 301). In the 
Turkish case, there were nine governments between 1991 and 2002. Of the two 
minority party governments, the one that was formed by Prime Minister Çiller (DYP 
government) could not satisfy the investiture requirement, and the other headed by 
Prime Minister Ecevit was formed with the explicit purpose of governing until the next 
election in 1999. The seven coalition governments ended for various reasons. However, 
except for the II. DYP-SHP and ANAP-DYP governments, they all ended as a result of 
institutional ways. The I. DYP-SHP government came to an end when Prime Minister 
Demirel resigned from his party to become president following his predecessor’s death. 
Two governments (the DYP-CHP and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments) ended due to 
early elections. One government (ANAP-DSP-DTP government) was toppled by a 
motion of censure. Had fierce inter-party conflict not precipitated the demise of the 
ANAP-DYP government, it would still have come to an end since the constitutional 
court ruled as null and void its vote of confidence in the parliament.3 The most 
interesting case of termination was Prime Minister Erbakan’s decision to resign in 
1997, as the coalition protocol of the RP-DYP government set a rule for the rotation of 
prime ministry between the two parties every year. Erbakan’s was not entirely a 
voluntary decision (Öke, Tirali, and Akın, 2002, p. 137); rather, it was a response to the 
pressures from the military as well as the opinion of a public skeptical to the RP’s 
                                                           
3 The leader of DYP, Çiller referred to the decision of the constitutional court as one of 
the reasons for termination of the ANAP-DYP cabinet. “Hükümet Bitmiştir”, Milliyet, 
25.05.1996.  
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policy agenda (Table 4.2.). There are similar examples in other south European 
countries such as Portugal (Freire, 2005).Moreover, the president acted in discretion to 
appoint ANAP’s leader, Yılmaz rather than the leader of DYP, Çiller as prime minister.  
These “events” refer to the final incidents that terminated these governments, but 
the functioning of the coalition governments were weakened by a series of other critical 
events.4 It is possible to categorize them under two broad categories as “technical” and 
“discretionary” mechanisms. Technical sources of termination refer to those beyond the 
control of the government parties (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 585). In this context, the 
death of President Özal and the election of Demirel as the next president resulted in the 
dissolution of the I. DYP-SHP cabinet. On the other hand, a motion of censure tabled 
against the ANAP-DSP-DTP government by CHP, whose external support had secured 
the vote of confidence for the government’s inauguration, put an end to this cabinet. 
Termination of this government and the ANAP-DYP government might also be related 
to the difficulties posed by the minority status of the cabinets.5 
The rest of the sources of cabinet termination had been discretionary in the sense 
that they emerged as a result of the interaction between the parliamentary parties. Policy 
divergence in the parliamentary debates over the draft bills, as well as severe personal 
conflicts between leaders of the rival parties, prevented these governments from 
functioning effectively and for a long time. Moreover, several parties taking part in the 
coalitions were struggling with internal problems which were primarily inflicted by 
competition for the party leadership. As a result, party leaders usually called for early 
elections when further collective governance became unlikely.  
 
                                                           
4 The categories in Table 4.2. are formed from the answers to the question as to which 
events the respondents would depict as turning points in the course of governance in my 
interviews conducted between April and May 2011.  
5 On the reasons for termination of the ANAP-DYP government, Çiller also declared 
that their government ended as a result of the court decision regarding the invalidity of 
the vote of confidence and the cabinet’s minority status which paralyzed functioning of 
the government. “Hükümet Bitmiştir”, Milliyet, 25.05.1996. 
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Table 4.2. Terminal Events 
Cabinet 
Discretionary  Technical 
Mechanisms of 
termination 
Inter-party conflict     Institutional rules     
Policy 
conflicts 
Personal 
problems 
Intra-party 
conflicts 
Early 
elections 
Regular 
elections 
Motion of 
censure 
Minority 
status 
Death of 
the 
president 
I.DYP-SHP               x death of the president 
II.DYP-SHP x X x           internal conflict 
DYP-CHP x X x X         early elections 
ANAP-DYP   X x       x   
internal conflict, court 
decision regarding vote of 
confidence 
RP-DYP     x           
resignation, extra-
parliamentary intervention 
ANAP-DSP-DTP       X   x x   motion of censure 
DSP-MHP-ANAP x   x X         early elections 
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As it is seen in Table 4.2., none of the respondents in my interviews referred to 
the critical events or exogenous shocks as identified by the events process approaches 
(Browne et al., 1984; Warwick, 1992). Indeed, throughout the 1990s, there were several 
events which could neither be predicted nor controlled easily. Turkey faced several 
critical economic crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. Political violence triggered by the 
conflict between the state security forces and the separatist Kurdish insurgency lasted 
until 1999 and peaked from 1992 to 1995. In 1999, Turkey was hit by a major 
earthquake which led to large-scale destruction and fatalities. There have been a 
number of political scandals involving corruption charges. After all, how did some of 
the coalitions, such as the DSP-MHP-ANAP government, manage to survive despite 
these critical events?  
First, some events such as political violence can be traced back to the period 
before 1991. Yet, this does not explain why governments endured when its intensity 
increased dramatically in the mid-1990s. Secondly, as Warwick (1992) and Sayarı 
(1980) suggest, events became detrimental when elections were closer and the 
incumbent government has been in power for a long time. For example, although the 
earthquake in 1999 did not result in the DSP-MHP-ANAP government’s resignation, 
the quarrel between the president and the prime minister triggered a series of events 
which eventually resulted in the call for early elections. Thirdly, governments have 
varied in their vulnerability to critical events (Laver and Shepsle, 1998). While the II. 
DYP-SHP government endured both political violence and economic difficulties; the 
DYP-CHP government could not tackle the crisis over bureaucratic appointments. 
Finally, these events might rather be considered as intervening variables. Otherwise, 
arguing that coalition governments ended when government parties were in 
disagreement, or early elections terminated an incumbent government might be mere 
tautology without first explaining the factors that have led to these developments. 
Events might change the distribution of bargaining power between governing parties or 
can become a strategic tool for opposition parties.  
In this respect, corruption is a good example. An element of patronage or 
clientelism has often been considered a part of the bargaining process in terms of 
sharing the coalition payoffs (Mershon, 2001). However, this aspect has often been 
considered to be one of the perks of government membership, and one which might be 
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used to garner votes in the next elections. When patronage turns into salient corruption, 
it might be treated as a political scandal which can terminate coalition governments 
serving as a critical event (Diermeier and Stevenson, 2000). However, in this study, I 
postulate that it might rather be considered a factor which had repercussions on inter-
party relations as well as intra-party structure, eventually affecting cabinet durability in 
the 1990s. Corruption has been a major source of allegations leveled towards 
governments in Turkey in general (Altun, 2004). We do not have factual information on 
the extent of political corruption in the period between 1991 and 2002. However, there 
were several corruption allegations leveled in this period against targets as diverse as 
SHP and its deputies (ĐSKĐ scandal) (Kartay, 1997, p. 361; Tokatlı, 2004, p. 151), the 
leader and deputies of DYP (Öke, Tirali, and Akın, 2002, pp. 138, 146) and ANAP 
(Bildirici, 2003) and deputies of MHP. The ANAP leader declared corruption as a 
reason of termination of the ANAP-DYP government,6 while the ANAP-DSP-DTP 
government was toppled as a result of an interpellation on the basis of corruption 
charges. Sezer’s accusation to Ecevit for tolerating corruption was one of the crises that 
triggered the termination of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government (Ahmad, 2004, p. 260). 
Here, it should be clarified that none of these examples indicate a general tendency in 
coalition governments towards corruption. However, corruption charges in this period 
decreased the electoral support to these parties; and changed the distribution of 
bargaining power between the partners and provided a venue for political actors within 
or outside of the government for terminating them. The leader of DYP, for instance, 
was forced into a government with RP to avoid the Supreme Criminal Court (Zürcher, 
2004, p. 299; Öke Tirali and Akın, 2002, p. 138).7 As Mershon (2002) aptly put, cabinet 
termination is a deliberate party choice, critical events rather influence interaction 
between the parties by changing the bargaining strategies.    
 
                                                           
6 Referring to the corruption charges against Çiller, Yılmaz declared that he would not 
tolerate corruption (“Çamurda Oturmam”, Milliyet, 10.04.1996). In addition, Yılmaz let 
his deputies choose how to vote,  rather than voting as a block in the motions of censure 
against Çiller (Kara, 2007, p. 239). 
7 Interestingly, in a book published by DYP while Çiller was still the party leader, it is 
stated that RP took Çiller hostage with motions considering the corruption allegations 
and as soon as she was cleared of charges, she started to fight against “reactionism” 
(Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002) 
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4.2.2. Cabinet Attributes 
 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that certain characteristics including majority status, 
minimal winning status and ideological connectedness tend to make cabinets more 
durable (Laver and Schofield, 1998, pp. 150-151). To begin with, cabinets with a 
parliamentary majority have a better chance of survival. A majority decreases 
vulnerability to parliamentary defeats which might lead to a call for elections or a 
search for alternative coalitions. Secondly, minimal winning status is one of the most 
common hypotheses in the coalition literature (Dodd, 1976). Accordingly, larger 
governments have more potential for disagreement and find it to be more difficult to 
manage conflicts. Hence, minimal winning cabinets tend to last longer than minority 
and surplus majority cabinets. Finally, the more mixed the government is with respect 
to the positions of the cabinet parties in the policy space, the shorter it lasts. In other 
words, minimally connected winning cabinets which only have parties as few as those 
whose combined parliamentary strength brings parliamentary majority and which are 
composed of ideologically compatible parties are argued to last longer than other types 
of cabinets.  
Throughout the multiparty period since 1950 in Turkey, as in Western European 
democracies, minority party governments in Turkey lasted the shortest among all types 
of government (126 days), while minority coalition governments have similarly been 
short-living among all types of coalition governments (366 days).8 Hence, majority 
status seems to be associated with longevity in general. In the 1990s, however, there 
were two minority coalition governments, one of which (ANAP-DSP-DTP government) 
lasted nearly two years (Table 4.3.) until it was toppled by a motion of censure. In other 
words, even when a minority coalition endured long, it does not necessarily mean that it 
was more durable. Among the coalition governments, in contradiction to the general 
expectations (Riker, 1984; Budge and Keman, 1993; Laver and Schofield, 1998), 
minimal winning coalition governments were not necessarily more durable than other 
types of coalition governments in Turkey in the 1990s. In fact, there were only three 
minimal winning coalition governments in the multiparty period (AP-MSP-MHP, II. 
                                                           
8 Computed by the author on the basis of data from Turkish Statistical Institute. 
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DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP governments). Among them, the AP-MSP-MHP and DYP-CHP 
cabinets survived merely for three to four months.  
Table 4.3. Cabinet Attributes and Duration 
Cabinet Type of Government 
Duration 
(in days) 
Effective 
Government 
Size* 
I. DYP-SHP surplus majority 543 0,81 
II. DYP-SHP minimal winning  832 0,82 
DYP-CHP minimal winning  128 0,82 
ANAP-DYP minority  114 0,89 
RP-DYP surplus majority 367 0,86 
ANAP-DSP-DTP minority  560 0,93 
DSP-MHP-ANAP surplus majority 1271 0,86 
*It measures government size by incorporating relative size of the government parties 
as well as their numbers (Warwick 1994, p. 35) 
Sources: Party Switching in Turkey Dataset (Kemahlıoğlu and Sayarı, 2011); Turkish 
Statistical Institute 
 
Warwick (1994) argues that not only the number of parties, but also their relative 
strength in the parliament (ratio of the seats) complicates the relations within the 
government. Using the concept of effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 
1979), he developed a measure called effective government size using the same formula 
for government parties (Warwick, 1994, p. 35). However, a positive or a negative 
covariance between duration and effective government size was not salient. 
Interestingly, when 15 coalition governments of the multiparty period were sorted with 
respect to duration, cabinet type and party composition, almost all of the cabinets that 
were more durable with respect to the country average (532 days) were the larger 
cabinets (cabinets with more than two parties) with the exception of the two DYP-SHP 
governments. Studies of coalition governments based on large-N datasets generally 
confirmed the positive relation between majority and minimal winning statuses and 
duration (Saalfeld, 2008, p. 363). However, variables that predicted between-country 
effects did not necessarily account for within-country effects (Grofman, 1989, p. 301). 
In Turkey, as in France, Iceland, the Netherlands and Israel, surplus majority cabinets 
lasted longer than minimal winning cabinets in the period between 1950 and 1983 
(Budge and Keman, 1993, p. 170).  
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Finally, Turkish coalition governments of the 1990s tended to be ideologically 
heterogeneous. Longitudinal surveys have revealed that parties maintained their 
position on the left-right continuum across time. While parties such as DSP, SHP, CHP 
and pro-Kurdish parties were located to the left of center, ANAP, DYP, RP and MHP 
were situated to the right of center persistently across time (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 
2007, p. 117). Accordingly, except for two cabinets (ANAP-DYP and RP-DYP), 
coalitions between parties which were on the opposite sides of the left-right cleavage 
were in the majority during the period between 1991 and 2002. In the multiparty period, 
five out of eight cabinets that were below the average cabinet duration were 
ideologically homogenous.  
 
 
 
4.2.3. Bargaining Environment Attributes 
 
 
Findings from the 1990s as well as earlier decades of multiparty politics suggest 
that cabinet attributes such as majority status, the cabinet type and government size 
were related to cabinet duration, although the direction of influence (i.e. 
positive/negative) might be counter-intuitive. Size, majority status and party 
composition of the government emerge as outcomes of long bargaining processes. 
Therefore, analyzing the characteristics of the bargaining environment in Turkey in the 
1990s is important for understanding the variance in cabinet duration. The party system 
and the institutions constitute the context in which bargaining takes place, hence they 
might have implications as to why one bargaining environment is conducive for the 
emergence of more durable cabinets while another engenders turbulence from the 
beginning (Budge and Keman, 1993).  
The higher the degree of fragmentation and polarization, the shorter the life of a 
government. In a fragmented and polarized party system environment, the distribution 
of the bargaining power (walk-away values) is more dispersed; and, thus, the bargaining 
environment is more vulnerable to slight changes. Therefore, coalitions are expected to 
be less durable in these systems (King, Alt, Burns, and Laver, 1990). A considerable 
number of deputies changed their parties in this period (Kemahlıoğlu and Sayarı, 2011). 
Moreover, increased electoral support to the two parties in the far-right, RP and MHP, 
revealed that the party system was increasingly polarized since mid-1990s as 
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polarization refers to the proportion of seats held by extremist parties in the parliament 
(Warwick, 1994, p. 39; Powell, 1984). After 1999, not only did the pro-Islamists lose 
considerable parliamentary strength with respect to the seat ratio, but also MHP 
changed its discourse by moving towards the center, which was simultaneously moving 
further to the right (Bora and Can, 2004, p. 470; Arıkan, 1991, p. 48). The existence of 
a dominant or a center party could stabilize the bargaining environment (Roozendaal, 
1992); however, this was absent in the party system (Sayarı, 2007, p. 203). Hence, the 
party system was increasingly fragmented and polarized at the same time. Actually, as 
the party system grew increasingly more fragmented during the 1990s, (i.e. from 4.68 in 
1991 to 6.15 in 1995 and then to 6.78 in 1999), and polarization peaked in the mid-
1990s and returned to a moderate level in the 1999 elections, cabinet duration followed 
a similar trend, having the lowest values around the mid-1990s when the effective 
number of the parties increased dramatically. 
In this fragmented party system, competition for the leadership of the center-left 
(between CHP and DSP) and the center-right (between ANAP and DYP, later including 
MHP) became decisive to the strategies of parties in the formation and maintenance of 
the governments.9 This was one of the reasons why there weren’t any minimal 
connected winning cabinets in the 1990s. Instead, parties that targeted the electorate 
with similar ideological tendencies devised strategies of attrition. This partly explains 
why there was a tendency to form surplus governments, and why these were the most 
durable forms of coalition governments. However, the similarity or difference of policy 
platforms was only one aspect of the story. In a fragmented party system, the 
distribution of bargaining power becomes more important as it influences party 
behavior during governance. Hence, in such cases, where a government is formed with 
a party which has both a high walk-away value and a different policy platform, it is 
likely to be highly durable. 
 
                                                           
9 Competition for the leadership of the center-right and the center-left was identified in 
the interviews as the main reason of why parties did not consider coalescing with 
ideologically adjacent parties and instead brought the proposal to the parties on the 
other side of the left-right continuum. 
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Figure 4.1. Effects of the Party System Fragmentation on Cabinet Duration 
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In contrast, if parties have different policy platforms and outside options (i.e. low 
walk-away values), those cabinets might be less durable. We might expect governments 
formed by parties with similar policy platforms and outside options to be the least 
durable. Figure 4.1. supports my proposition in this regard. The parties in the three 
governments with the shortest duration in the 1990s had low walk-away values. During 
the DYP-CHP government, ANAP was an alternative outside option for DYP, and the 
fact that DYP did not give many concessions to CHP can be explained by that aspect.10 
The RP-DYP coalition was under continuous pressure for a new government formula 
excluding RP. ANAP, on the other hand, was an outside option for RP. However, those 
four governments above the average cabinet duration were all ideologically 
heterogeneous that were relatively less concerned with losing the electoral base to the 
other parties within the government.11 Moreover, the ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-
ANAP governments were the only possible governments allowed by the parliamentary 
arithmetic without many outside options. As such, the way fragmentation influenced the 
formation and maintenance of governments seems to explain why ideologically 
disconnected and surplus cabinets tended to last longer in Turkey, in contrast to the 
                                                           
10 Partly in 1993 and throughout 1994 and 1995, there were several articles in the daily 
Milliyet indicating that DYP, ANAP and RP were in continuous contact about an 
alternative government (02.04.1994, 24.11.1994, 23.03.1994, 22.09.1995, 20.11.1995).  
11 The same reply was repeated for the question “what kind of coalition governments do 
you think might be more successful and durable in Turkey?”: governments composed of 
parties “supported by different ideological corridors” as they will have “fewer 
incentives to attempt to discredit its partners vis-a-vis the public opinion”.  
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general trends in Europe. Not only the level of fragmentation, but also the factors that 
shape the nature of fragmentation shed light on the variance in cabinet duration.  
In fact, coalition governments could have been more durable within a more 
favorable institutional setting in Turkey. Since the 1990s, institutionalism has come into 
prominence in the coalition research (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Diermeier, 2006). 
Institutions influence the bargaining environment. Cabinets tend to last shorter where 
votes of confidence are constitutional rules. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that 
countries with constitutions which do not set investiture requirement or have positive 
parliamentarism (i.e. constructive vote of no confidence, e.g. Belgium since 1995 and 
Germany); and, fixed inter-election periods, have the most durable coalition 
governments (Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2003, p. 63).  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, institutional mechanisms as diverse as early 
elections, motions of censure and court decisions invalidating votes of confidence 
dominated the way governments ended in this period (Table 4.2.). Termination of 
ANAP-DYP government may be affiliated with the court decisions. Likewise, when the 
leader of MHP called for an early election in 2002, the government was about to be 
dissolved as it was close to losing the parliamentary majority as a result of defections 
from DSP. Another impact of the institutions on cabinet duration was through 
increasing and decreasing the costs of making and breaking the coalition governments 
as Mershon elegantly illustrated in the Italian case (Mershon, 1996). In countries like 
Norway and Sweden, where the inter-election period has been fixed, parties had fewer 
incentives for terminating the government. In countries like Turkey and Italy, where the 
decision to call for elections was easy, the early election option became a strategic tool. 
In general, parties tried to call for an early election when they anticipated a favorable 
outcome whether they were within the government or not (Lupia and Strøm, 1995; 
Strøm and Swindle, 2002). For instance, the DYP-CHP government was formed in 
1995 on the condition that the government would call for an early election (Yalansız, 
2006, p. 465). In that period, both leaders expected to increase their votes in the next 
election. The leader of DYP was convinced that the voters would have appreciated her 
government’s success in coping with the economic difficulties.12 As another example, 
                                                           
12 Interview on April 6, 2011. 
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the leader of CHP tabled a motion of censure against the ANAP-DSP-DTP government 
in 1999 hoping to benefit from the electoral volatility.13 The existence of the motion of 
censure as such was another aspect of the institutional setting.. Although FP was 
preparing to table another motion to censure for the DSP-MHP-ANAP government,14 it 
was used only once in the 1990s. In this respect, the constitutional rules of government 
formation and termination interacted with the characteristics of the party system 
decreasing the survival chances of the governments. In some countries, government 
formation has been regulated through institutions such as the position of informateur. 
The existence of such mechanisms could have contributed to decreasing the dearth of 
information and high levels of uncertainty, as well as increasing the possibility of the 
formation of tighter coalitions.  
In a similar way, the existence of more conflict management mechanisms might 
have increased the survival chances for these governments. In European coalition 
systems several types of coalition management mechanisms have been established 
including inner cabinets, cabinet committees, coalition committees, committees of 
parliamentary leaders and party summits (Andeweg and Timmermans, 2003, pp. 270-
272). Sometimes they are established for a specific issue or sometimes in order to deal 
with potential sources of crisis generally. Moreover, their level of institutionalization 
might vary from irregular and informal settings such as in Germany to being permanent 
bodies with a separate staff. In the Turkish coalitions of the 1970s, the level of 
communication between the parties was largely limited (Sayarı, 1980, p. 229). In the 
1990s, inner cabinets similar to the German examples were usually active; however, the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms depended mostly on the personality of the leaders. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, certain ministers have been renowned for acting 
as key communication figures between the parties. Although these deputies were also 
accused of pursuing personal interests, they obviously played some role in conflict 
management. The DSP-MHP-ANAP government constitutes a good example of the 
contribution of these mechanisms on the longevity of cabinet. “The Leaders’ Summit”, 
which met regularly and resolved the problems at the top executive level of the parties, 
                                                           
13 Interview on April 22, 2011.  
14 Interview on April 29, 2011. 
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had been helpful in the government’s survival despite ideological divergence as well as 
exogenous shocks including the earthquake and the economic crises.  
A comparative study of the Netherlands and Belgium identifies coalition 
agreements among notable conflict management mechanisms. Accordingly, explicit 
articles might decrease the costs of bargaining in the later stages of governance, 
however, the existence of explicit commitments might not necessarily render their 
implementation easier (Timmermans, 2006, p. 268). As long as the Turkish party 
system remains fragmented and the 10 percent electoral threshold is maintained, it is 
debatable whether including explicit commitments might be better or not. However, 
establishing permanent institutions might enforce mutual communication in the Turkish 
governments to a certain extent. In my opinion, coalition committees might serve best 
for the requirements of the Turkish political system. This committee would include both 
ministers and party leaders outside the government, similar to the Italian system 
(Andeweg and Timmermans, 2003, pp. 271-272). Given that the electoral threshold 
causes representation problems, the existence of a similar mechanism might create an 
effective checks and balances system, which is itself the most important contribution of 
coalition governments to democracy.  
In the Turkish case, as institutionalized coalition mechanisms were rare in the 
1990s, personal attitudes became decisive from time to time in the functioning and 
durability of the governments. In general, as the literature on coalition governments 
suggests, low institutionalization brings about more discretionary interventions from the 
head of state as is the case in Italy and to a relatively limited extent in Finland (Strøm et 
al., 1994, p. 312). Turkish presidents have exerted influence for similar reasons. Did the 
intervention of the president have a positive or a negative effect on cabinet duration in 
the 1990s? My interviews with those party officials who served in the coalition 
governments yielded mixed results. Some respondents criticized Presidents Özal, 
Demirel and Sezer for impairing the natural course of governance by blocking some 
parliamentary bills and acting on behalf of extra-parliamentary actors including the 
military and social or economic interest groups. Others pointed to the fact that President 
Demirel brokered certain coalition arrangements and was helpful in overcoming some 
crises as well as preventing non-civilian interventions which could have been more 
detrimental to the political system. In my opinion, presidents might contribute to the 
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functioning of governments and thus contribute to cabinet durability in Turkey, if 
presidential powers are limited to the level as it should be in a classical parliamentary 
system.  
Other than the presidents, the personality and behavior of party leaders influenced 
cabinet durability. Sayarı (1980, p. 213) indicates that cabinet durability in the 1960s 
and 1970s was influenced by the relations between the leaders of parties. One can 
observe a similar trend in the 1990s. Coalition governments in this period were often 
characterized by infighting. Realistically, this might be an overgeneralization of the 
1990s. Inter-party conflict characterized the relations between ANAP and DYP, who 
formed a government only once that lasted slightly more than three months. Hence, this 
case cannot be generalized to the rest of the time period. On the contrary, there were 
counter examples in this period. Demirel and Đnönü were in good terms and tried to 
resolve the conflicts as much as possible rather than increasing the tension (Arcayürek, 
2000, p. 73; Tokatlı, 2004, p. 157). Ecevit and Yılmaz had a working relationship which 
contributed to the management of crises in both ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-
ANAP governments. Bahçeli, on the other hand, despite his party’s critical view of DSP 
for ideological reasons and toward ANAP due to its involvement with alleged corrupt 
practices, displayed accommodating behavior appreciated by both parties.15 Apparently, 
the moderate behavior of Bahçeli was surprising for two other parties in the coalition. “I 
got anything I wanted, and Bahçeli did not oppose”, noted a minister from ANAP, “he 
was abnormally accommodating”.16 Karayalçın’s moderate personality might have 
ameliorated otherwise tense relations between DYP and SHP as well.17 Presumably, the 
conflict between the leaders of two center-right parties might have been less intense, if 
the party system was less fragmented. Moreover, if institutional settings had limited the 
strategic attempts of parliamentary dissolution, party leaders might have acted in a more 
reconciliatory fashion.  
 
                                                           
15 Interviews on April 22 and 29, May 3, 2001.  
16 Interview on April 22, 2011. 
17 Interview on April 6, 2011.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
COALITIO POLITICS I TURKEY I COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 
THE TURKISH EXCEPTIOALISM? 
 
 
 
 
What are the major similarities and differences between Western European 
countries and Turkey concerning some of the important characteristics of coalition 
politics and behavior? Do the trends concerning the durability of coalition governments, 
the way they are terminated, and their institutional context in Turkey during the 1990s 
deviate significantly from those observed in other democracies in the same time period? 
Is it possible to talk about “Turkish exceptionalism”, when coalitions are viewed in a 
comparative perspective? The purpose of this chapter is to address these and related 
questions utilizing the data I have collected on coalition governments in Western 
European democracies and Turkey. The chapter begins with comparing the trends in 
cabinet duration and termination across countries. Next, it examines the party systems 
and institutional settings in European democracies and Turkey to understand the context 
from which the governments emanate and function. In this section, the study mainly 
adopts the method of agreement to eliminate rival explanations. Finally, it analyzes the 
different practices and mechanisms used in coalition governments which are used to 
cope with the challenges of multiparty governance.  
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5.1. The Trends in Cabinet Duration and the Cabinet Attributes 
 
 
 
During the nearly five decades between the 1940s and 1990s, 64 percent of 
European governments
1
 and 40 percent of Turkish governments included more than one 
political party. Turkey, just as many other European countries, began to have coalition 
governments in the early 1960s as the change in the electoral system from a plurality to 
proportional representation increased political fragmentation. In these five decades, 
cabinet duration improved in Western Europe on average as both party and coalition 
governments became more durable. However, inferring the viability of European 
coalitions on the basis of this aggregate trend might be misleading as individual 
countries have had different trajectories. While the coalition cabinets in Luxembourg, 
Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Finland and Norway 
became more durable over time; those in Austria, Ireland, Germany and Italy followed 
a downward trend.
2
 In Turkey, while the average duration decreased slightly, coalition 
governments definitely became more durable over time. Overall, cabinet duration by 
decade and by the type of government varied within the European countries.
3
  
In the 1990s, Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece and Portugal were ruled solely 
by party governments. Similarly, three out of four governments in both Norway and 
Sweden were also formed by single parties. Turkey and France had both party and 
coalition governments, while the rest of the European countries alternated between 
different coalition cabinets. Cabinet duration improved in general; however, Italy and 
Finland maintained their places below the European average (Figure 5.1.). During this 
period, Turkey was among the less durable countries such as Italy and Finland. In other 
                                                           
1
 In this chapter, the terms “Europe” and “European countries” exclude Turkey for the 
sake of comparison. All figures and tables are based on the Cabinets and Coalition 
Bargaining Dataset (2008), updated by adding the Turkish cases in the 1990s and 
completing the missing variables for those European governments which continued to 
rule after 1999. 
2
 The average values of cabinet duration for the coalition governments by decade were 
computed. Then for each country, trendlines were observed in time.   
3
 Average cabinet duration in Europe is nearly 698.72 days while the standard deviation 
is 511.95. Standard deviation values are also high for the individual countries. This 
indicates that variation has been high between and within the countries across time. 
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words, not only Italian (405.2 days), but also Turkish (545 days) and Finnish (769.8 
days) coalition governments lasted shorter than most of their counterparts in Europe 
(891.9 days) in the 1990s (Table 5.1.). 
In this period, the majority of coalition governments were minimal winning 
cabinets (26 out of 42). On average, this type of cabinet tended to last longer than the 
other types. Also, all the minimal winning cabinets in Austria, France and Germany 
were ideologically connected. This indicates that in general, European parties aimed to 
forge coalitions which were easier to manage while sharing the coalition payoffs 
between the smallest number of parties. Besides, they intended to establish 
ideologically connected cabinets whose policy programs would be devised with relative 
ease; with legislation that would be less likely to be protracted. However, there were 
outliers. While surplus majority governments were both rare and short-lived in most of 
the countries, they were the most common type of coalition arrangements and also 
lasted quite long in both Turkey and Finland. Minority coalition cabinets have been 
extraordinarily common and durable in almost every country where they existed, 
contrary to the literature. They lasted even longer than the minimal winning coalition 
governments in Denmark and Ireland. Only in Turkey, were they relatively less durable.   
The relation between the government size (number of parties in the cabinet) and 
duration has been inconsistent.
4
 Usually, more than two parties coalesced. Whether the 
government was small in size like Austria, Luxembourg and Turkey or large in size like 
Sweden and Italy does not reveal a clear pattern.
5
  
  
                                                           
4
 Pairwise correlation test reveals a very weak negative relation, however, it is not 
significant at p< 0.01 (p=0.1973). 
5
 The number of parties in the cabinet is used for testing the size hypothesis of Riker 
(1962). Riker argues that parties are predominantly office-seeking in their behavior. 
Therefore, they will try to forge a coalition with the smallest number of parties. The 
type of the cabinet and the number of parties in the cabinet were analyzed in the 
coalition literature in this context. Here, looking at the cabinet type gives clearer results 
while the relation between the size and duration of the cabinet remains inconclusive.  
81 
 
82 
 
 
Table 5.1. Cabinet Duration by Cabinet Type in the 1990s (in days) 
Country 
Minority Coalition 
Governments 
Minimal Winning 
Coalition 
Governments** 
Surplus Majority 
Governments 
Total  
Frequency 
Average 
Duration 
Frequency 
Average 
Duration 
Frequency 
Average 
Duration 
Frequency 
Average 
Duration 
!umber of 
Parties in the 
Cabinet 
Italy 
  
4** 463.5 2 291.5 6 406.2 5 
Turkey 2 337 2 480 3 727 7 545 2.28 
Finland 
  
1 264 3 938.3 4 769.8 3.75 
Denmark 4 844.3 1** 604 
  
5 796.2 2.6 
Austria 
  
4** 799.8 
  
4 799.8 2 
Norway 1 868 
    
1 868 3 
Belgium 
  
2 1325 1 57 3 902.3 4 
Ireland 2 1045 2 778.5 
  
4 911.8 2.25 
Luxembourg 
  
2 922.5 
  
2 922.5 2 
France  
  
3** 1047.7 
  
3 1047.7 2.33 
Germany 
  
3** 1412 1 33 4 1067.3 2.25 
Sweden 1 1081 
    
1 1081 4 
The Netherlands 
  
1 1355 1 1449 2 1402 3 
Iceland 
  
3** 1466.7 
  
3 1466.7 2 
  
        
  
Europe* 8 927 26 965.7 8 617.1 42 891.9 2.95 
  
        
  
* Excluding Turkey 
** All four governments in Austria, three governments in Germany, three governments in France, one in Denmark, one in Italy and one government in Iceland were 
minimal winning connected cabinets. 
Sources: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset (2008), Turkish Statistical Institute 
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An analysis of the relation between the cabinet attributes of size, ideological 
compatibility, type and duration yields mixed results. In general, the prevalence and 
durability of minimal winning cabinets has been remarkable. Moreover, Austria, France 
and Germany had tight coalitions, all of which were both minimal and connected and, 
thus the size of the government (as in number of cabinet parties) was very small. For 
these countries, there is a high correlation between the cabinet attributes and duration. 
However, where they existed, minority coalition cabinets have also been very stable. In 
the least durable cluster of countries, Italy, Turkey and Finland, the relation between the 
cabinet attributes and durability did not yield meaningful results, although both Finland 
and Italy had large sized governments at that time, which probably made it more 
difficult to manage inter-party relations. 
The way cabinets are terminated seems to vary according to the cabinet type. In 
countries where minimal winning and minimal connected winning cabinets prevailed, 
these cabinets survived the entire inter-election period. In Ireland and Denmark, 
minority coalitions have been common as well as durable; however, they were more 
vulnerable to inter-party conflict. Where surplus majority cabinets prevailed, the 
termination of a cabinet by resignation has been common. In Italy, Turkey and Finland, 
inter-party conflict stemming from both policy divergences and personal dissension 
weakened and eventually broke the governments. 
In Turkey, France and Luxembourg, there have been instances where the 
opposition parties organized to defeat the acting cabinet in the parliament and used the 
institutions such as motions of censure and parliamentary queries to topple the 
government. However, political parties usually did not just resign and allow another 
party to form the new government. In fact, unless they expected a favorable electoral 
outcome they tried to stay in power. Therefore, when possible, cabinets ended through 
calling for early elections. In general, the main pattern of the way cabinets terminated 
was that discretionary types of termination were specific to the countries with less 
durable coalitions while technical reasons constituted the most common reasons in the 
more durable coalition systems.    
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Table 5.2. Cabinet Termination in the 1990s 
Country* 
Technical Sources of 
Termination 
Discretionary Sources of 
Termination 
    
Inter-party 
Conflict 
  
Regular 
Elections 
Other 
Technical 
Reasons 
Policy Personal 
Early 
Elections 
Italy 1 
 
3 1 1 
Turkey 0 3 1 1 2 
Finland 3 
 
1 
 
  
Denmark 0 
 
1 1 3 
Austria 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Norway 1 
   
  
Belgium 2 
   
1 
Ireland 1 
  
2 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 
  
  
France  1 1 
  
1 
Germany 4 
   
  
Sweden 1 
   
  
The 
Netherlands 
2 
   
  
Iceland 3 
   
  
  
    
  
Europe** 22 2 6 4 8 
  
    
  
* Sorted in descending order with regard to durability of coalition cabinets 
* *Excluding Turkey 
Sources: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset (2008), Turkish Statistical 
Institute 
 
 
 
5.2. The Context: Party Systems and Institutional Rules 
 
 
 
Several studies have verified that cabinet duration varies systematically with the 
fractionalization of the party system (Damgaard, 2008; Laver and Schofield, 1998; 
Warwick, 1994). The more fragmented and polarized party systems are expected to be 
more inclined to produce less durable cabinets. Yet, this hypothesis might only be 
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verified by a large pooled time series cross-sectional data. As Laver and Schofield 
(1990, p. 149) warn, it is more difficult to infer the relation between durability and the 
party system when one considers the variation in durability within the countries and 
also the factor of less time.
6
 The characteristics of the party system influence durability 
by increasing the level of bargaining complexity (King, Alt, Burns, and Laver, 1990, p. 
585). Hence, to get a more comprehensive view, rather than assessing each feature of 
the party system in isolation, fragmentation should be analyzed together with 
polarization (measured in the share of the extremist parties) and the number of issue 
dimensions (under the category of bargaining systems). For instance, in large party 
systems such as Norway and Sweden, the level of uncertainty would be lower since 
there was only one issue dimension and no relevant extremist party. On the other hand, 
although the Netherlands has been identified as a multipolar system (Laver and Shepsle, 
1996, p. 159), country experts challenged this categorization on the basis of the fact that 
the Dutch bargaining system has been predominated by the Christian Democrats 
(Timmermans and Andeweg, 2003, p. 358). A dominant core party in a fragmented 
party system stabilizes the bargaining environment. Hence, more durable systems were 
either less fragmented or had other characteristics of the party system to ease the 
bargaining processes.  
The cluster of the least durable coalitions involved; on the other hand, highly 
fractionalized and polarized party systems especially in Italy and Turkey.
7
 The Italian 
party system went through a major transformation in the 1990s. The Christian 
Democratic Party (DC) had been a core party, building coalitions with the other small 
center-right parties for a long time. In the 1990s, the party was weakened by severe 
factional splits and a series of corruption charges (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 443). 
However, it was the set of electoral reforms from a PR to a mixed system in 1992 and 
1993 that led to the demise of the traditional parties (Morlino, 1996; Katz, 1996). Small 
parties started to coalesce before the elections within the ideological blocs, and the 
party system started to gain a bipolar character around center-left and center-right 
                                                           
6
 A negative and weak correlation (-0.3323) between fragmentation and duration seems 
to exist; however, it is not significant at p<0.01 (p=0.2458). 
7
 The polarization level in Turkey was measured as the average seat share of the pro-
Islamist RP and its successor FP in the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections.  
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proto-coalitions. Nevertheless, transformation of the party system was not sufficient 
enough to lengthen cabinet life. The Turkish party system remained multipolar 
throughout the 1990s, especially during the mid-1990s, but the cabinets were relatively 
more durable compared to Italy. The ANAP-DSP-DTP government was large in size 
and did not have majority status. The DSP-MHP-ANAP government was also oversized 
and lacked ideological coherence. However, both governments lasted fairly long.  
King et al (1990, p. 589) argue that governments formed with difficulty tended to 
be short-lived. Accordingly, the length of negotiations and the existence of fruitless 
bargaining rounds point out the difficulty in forging a coalition. The coalition 
arrangements in Italy and Turkey have been concluded in nearly three weeks on 
average, however, communication between the parties have generally taken even longer 
in more durable systems such the Netherlands, Austria and Germany.  The length of 
bargaining processes stems from different reasons in these two clusters which also 
varied extensively in durability.
8
 The parties had fierce debates on the allocation of 
offices in Italy (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 456) and in Turkey,
9
 policy issues were 
largely left to the period after the government was inaugurated. In the cluster of the 
more durable systems, parties spent a fairly long time and expended intensive effort to 
reach a common policy agenda. Some bargaining rounds yielded inconclusive results in 
these countries, although the parties were ideologically adjacent. Hence, durability did 
not vary with long bargaining durations and the existence of inconclusive rounds in 
these cases (Table 5.3.). On the contrary, parties decided on a more detailed policy 
agenda had less conflict once the cabinet took office.  
                                                           
8
 Pairwise correlation test for the relation between average country duration and average 
bargaining duration of individual countries yields insignificant at p< 0.01 (p=0.3541). 
9
 Interviews in April and May 2011. 
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Table 5.3. Bargaining Environment in Turkey and Europe, 1990-2006 
Country* 
Effective 
!umber 
of 
Parties 
Extremist 
Party 
Seat 
Share 
Bargaining 
System 
List 
PR Investiture** 
Special 
Majority 
Requirement 
Head of 
State 
Appoints 
Cabinet  Informateur 
Continuation 
Rule 
Bargaining 
Duration 
(in 
Days)**** 
Inconclusive 
Bargaining 
Round 
Italy 5.58 15.89 multipolar x** x 
    
24.16 x 
Turkey 5.87 20.89 multipolar x x x x 
  
25.14 x 
Finland 5.05 0 multipolar x 
 
x x x 
 
20.25   
Denmark 4.50 0 multipolar x 
    
x 5.4   
Austria 3.42 0 bipolar x 
 
x 
   
53   
Norway 4.36 0 unipolar x 
    
x 5   
Belgium 7.86 5.24 multipolar x x*** x 
 
x 
 
46.33 x 
Ireland 3.26 0 unipolar 
 
x 
   
x 27 x 
Luxembourg 3.90 0 unipolar x x x 
 
x x 19   
France  3.03 4.73 unipolar 
   
x 
 
x 2.66   
Germany 2.87 0 bipolar x x x 
   
27.5   
Sweden 4.19 0 unipolar x x 
  
x x 19   
The 
Netherlands 
5.12 1 multipolar x 
   
x x 100 x 
Iceland 3.74 0 unipolar 
     
x 10.33 x 
  
          
  
* Sorted in descending order with regard to durability of coalition cabinets 
** Italy applies list PR partially 
*** !o investiture requirement in Belgium since 1995 
**** Bargaining duration as the time elapsed between the resignation of a cabinet and inauguration of the new one 
Source: Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining in Europe Dataset (2008) 
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The final aspect of the context in which governments were formed and functioned 
is the institutions. Since the 1990s, there has been substantial research pointing to the 
role of institutions in lengthening or shrinking cabinet duration (Diermeier, 2008). 
Specifically, many countries did not require their cabinets to secure the active support 
of the majority of the parliament (investiture requirement), putting the burden of the 
change of cabinet on the opposition. One type of the mechanisms that aimed to make 
the formation of a cabinet easier and termination of it more difficult is negative 
parliamentarism. In Finland, Iceland, Denmark and Norway, the opposition has to 
organize to show that the majority of the parliament is against a new cabinet (Bergman, 
1993, p. 287). In this way, minority coalitions could be formed and maintained in 
Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. Another mechanism is the constructive vote of no 
confidence. It requires the opposition to form an alternative coalition so as to table a 
vote of no confidence. It originated in Germany, and then Belgium adopted it in the 
1995 to enhance durability. A third mechanism has been developed in Finland and 
Ireland, where the incumbent government composition is favored in the case of a 
stalemate, and the laws continue to favor the status quo government during its 
governance (Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994, p. 320). Besides that, in many countries 
the acting prime ministers have an opportunity to continue after the elections unless the 
opposition is mobilized. Moreover, in Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, the heads of state appoint an informateur who has the task of assessing the 
potential coalitions. The informateur has usually been the leader of the largest party (De 
Winter, 1995, p. 123). In this sense, the informateur resembles the party leaders who 
were supposed to preside over government formation in other parliamentary systems. 
However, in the systems that use the informateur, negotiations have become more 
policy-dominated. Thus the prospective coalition government’s policies are pre-
designed. Therefore, it is the motivations of the actors rather than the institution of the 
informatuer that decreases the uncertainty and mistrust stemming from the formation 
stage. Finally, the influence of the prerogatives of the heads of state in government 
formation on cabinet duration has also been mixed. It is argued that in Finland, 
involvement of the heads of state has been destabilizing as sometimes they have 
supported a small party and endorsed the formation of a minority government which 
had little chance of survival due to the investiture requirement (Nousiainen, 2000, pp. 
268-269). Accordingly, the strengthening of the element of parlimentarianism was seen 
as a positive development. On the other hand, in Italy the heads of state had almost no 
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power in government formation, but this did not prevent the fragile nature of cabinets. 
Hence, the role of the head of state might depend on the conditions of the political 
system rather than being an influential dynamic. In Italy and Turkey, the main problem 
seemed to be that the investiture requirement has not been regulated and ameliorated by 
any major institutional mechanisms. The findings from Turkey and the other countries 
indicate that the cabinet attributes, the characteristics of the party system, the indicators 
of bargaining difficulty as well as the institutional rules pertaining to government 
formation and termination provide only a partial explanation with regard to the 
dynamics of durability. Coalition behavior and the mechanisms which regulate the 
behavior of the political parties should also be analyzed.  
 
 
 
5.3. Maintaining Governments 
 
 
 
Electoral volatility has been a persistent aspect of Turkish politics in the 1990s 
(Sayarı, 2007, p. 200; Şekercioğlu and Arıkan, 2008, p. 218). It contributed to the 
controversial nature of the relations between the parties. Shifts in voter preferences fed 
mistrust between the parties. Competition over the leadership of the ideological blocs 
prevented the emergence of ideologically compatible governments. This also fostered 
an opportunistic type of coalition behavior. Parties resorted to calling for early elections 
whenever they expected to attract floating votes. Hence, electoral volatility has been a 
malady that resulted in premature termination in the Turkish case. However, electoral 
volatility has been rising across Europe in the same period. From the 1980s to the 
1990s, it rose in all countries that are analyzed in this study, except in Iceland and 
Luxembourg. For instance, the percentage of electoral volatility doubled in the 
Netherlands. Yet, the majority of these countries enjoyed improved cabinet longevity.  
Studies based on large datasets have concurred on the significance of country 
effects in explaining variance in duration. Strøm et al (2000, p. 416) emphasize that 
country specific factors have been determinant in both the formation and the 
governance phases. So far the analyses in this study suggest that a focus on the 
dynamics pertaining to the formation phase might be confounding various other 
influences. This study presumes that the characteristics of coalition governance 
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mutually reinforce the dynamics emanating from the cabinet attributes and the 
bargaining environment, determining the actual cabinet life-span. It was mentioned 
above that some countries have devised specific institutions for making government 
formation easier, for instance through making it more difficult to replace an incumbent 
government in the inter-election period. However, such mechanisms did not prevent the 
threats to survival originating from the conflicts between and within the parties. Even in 
the coalition systems where these mechanisms have been at play for a long time, such 
as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria, cabinets have not been oblivious to 
the inter-party conflict. Nevertheless, discretionary cabinet termination has become less 
frequent over time and has disappeared in the majority of the governments in more 
durable systems (Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge, 2000). This implies that 
governments survived the crises through building cooperation and responding to the 
challenges.   
There is ample evidence with regard to the institutional framework of coalition 
building. However, institutions pertaining to government functioning have been rarely 
studied. This partly stems from the fact that communication between the parties has 
been private by and large. One way of analyzing the mechanisms of government 
maintenance is by assessing coalition agreements. These agreements have been rare and 
the bulk of the negotiations were not codified into written agreements until the 1990s. 
Throughout the 1990s, Italy has been notable for the absence of such documents, while 
one government in Denmark and one in Germany kept the arrangements private. 
However, written coalition agreements have been increasingly common in other 
countries in this period. This might be considered a learning process. As one scholar 
notes, the behavior of the political actors are not only driven by greed but also by fear 
(Strøm, 2008, p. 539). Thus, over time, political parties gradually realized the role of 
written commitments in building trust and decreasing uncertainty. Overall, the available 
documents are the sources of information on the dynamics of the interaction between 
the governing partners. The agreements might produce smooth functioning as long as 
they include extensive and explicit policy provisions rather than being dominated by 
office sharing. More importantly, parties should be actually committed to keep their 
promises as outlined in these documents. Otherwise, explicit compromises might 
become a drawback and induce resignation.  
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A characteristic of the more durable systems has been intensive and time-
consuming bargaining processes on the policies. Consequently, coalition agreements 
have been detailed with respect to the policy agendas and have reflected the 
compromises between the parties especially in Germany and Austria. This has enabled 
the parties to legislate and solve the disputes more easily (Miller and Müller, 2010, p. 
349). All coalition agreements in Austria have further devised specific mechanisms of 
coordination and conflict management. Some coalition agreements also involved 
clauses which aim to enhance coalition discipline (Müller, 2003, p. 104). In Ireland, on 
the other hand, the agreements did not propose coalition discipline per se, but ad hoc 
meetings of the party leaders have been quite effective and coalition discipline became 
a typical aspect of these governments despite the challenging political agenda (Mitchell, 
2003, p. 140). As a result, coalition governments have been relatively durable in 
Ireland. The fact that coalition governance in this country has evolved through ad hoc 
and informal mechanisms indicated that high coalition discipline might be influential 
for government survival. The study of these arrangements in Belgium and the 
Netherlands revealed that parties have been faithful to their commitments most of the 
time. Having resolved the disputes before the cabinet took office prevented renewed 
conflict during legislation. However, the failure to realize commitments resulted in the 
annulment of the coalition in a number of cases in Belgium (Timmermans, 2006, p. 
270). There are also examples of certain mechanisms to prevent opportunistic behavior. 
In Austria, France and the Netherlands, several governments included a clause in the 
coalition arrangements which specified that the dissolution of the cabinet would 
automatically result in calling elections (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 574). Hence, it 
forced the coalition parties to maintain the agreed government unless they anticipated a 
favorable outcome. In Norway, the inter-election period is fixed, therefore, parties 
cannot resort to a strategic dissolution given that their parliamentary strength will 
remain constant (Müller and Strøm, 2003, p. 579).  
In addition to the mechanisms mentioned above, four main types of conflict 
management mechanisms emerged in Europe during this period.
10
 Inner cabinets 
comprising the leaders of cabinet parties have been common in Belgium, Iceland, the 
                                                           
10
 The debate in this part relies on the findings of the author from the Cabinets and 
Coalition Bargaining Dataset (2008).  
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Netherlands, Norway and Iceland. Cabinet committees were formed from time to time 
for resolving disputes on specific issues in Denmark, Finland, France and Austria. 
Coalition committees which also included the opposition leaders existed in some 
governments in Germany, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. They were widely used in the 
grand coalitions of Austria and Germany between the Social Democrats and the 
Christian Democrats. These types of committees were convened more frequently during 
the crises. Party summits; on the other hand, gathered the leaders of the cabinet parties 
who were not on the cabinet in person in Germany, Ireland and Italy.  
In Italy, the coalition agreements were largely oral unwritten and office 
considerations dominated the bargaining processes. Without extensive and explicit 
agreement on the policy program, legislation crises were common. Moreover, coalition 
discipline was so weak that almost half of the government bills did not pass in the 
parliament in this decade (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 460). In the absence of 
institutional rules that sanction the maintenance of the government, strategic 
parliamentary dissolution was not costly for the parties (Mershon, 2002). Moreover, the 
use of conflict management mechanisms was considerably rare. Majority summits as a 
variant of coalition committee were used in the 1990s, however, in a highly fragmented 
party system with numerous small-size parties and low coalition discipline. This had the 
negative side effect of further diminishing cabinet autonomy rather than contributing to 
durability (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 461). 
The Turkish coalition agreements in this period traditionally started with outlining 
the general principles, the envisioned legislation with regard to economic policies, 
social welfare, democratization and security. Whether these articles were binding is 
questionable as from time to time legislative deadlocks emerged even on the projected 
legislation. In some cases, such as in the I. DYP-SHP government, parts of the 
provisions could not be realized as the political and economic turmoil impeded 
functioning. In the II. DYP-SHP, DYP-CHP and ANAP-DYP governments, inter-party 
conflicts over legislation were more common. The coalition agreements arguably 
reduced the transaction costs in the RP-DYP, ANAP-DSP-DTP and DSP-MHP-ANAP 
governments. The last government especially had a vibrant legislation record; however, 
as there is substantial evidence that the genuine protocol was kept private; it is not easy 
to assess its sources in the written public record. In three out of the seven public 
93 
 
protocols, there were clauses with regard to the legislation. In the II. DYP-SHP 
government, it was stated that the targeted legislation would be scheduled in a series of 
meetings that included the leaders of the party groups, and that the top level bureaucrats 
would be appointed by the nomination of the relevant minister and the consensus of the 
prime minister and deputy prime ministers. The protocol of the DYP-CHP cabinet 
prescribed passing governmental decrees with joint signatures of the prime minister and 
the deputy prime minister. It further stipulated for the collective use and management of 
public funds. The ANAP-DYP cabinet’s protocol also involved similar clauses with 
regard to bureaucratic appointments and the management of public funds. It had also 
foreseen legislation which would strengthen the signature powers of the deputy prime 
minister. The fact that senior partners in all three governments continuously criticized 
the leader of the larger party in imposing government decisions suggests that the leaders 
were not committed to these explicit clauses. On the contrary, the leaders were more 
loyal to the DSP-MHP-ANAP government’s agreements. This coalition government’s 
agreement also specified that all cabinet decrees should be collectively signed. This 
increased the level of coalition discipline. Only in the critical voting of the EU 
harmonization laws package, MHP left its party group to decide freely, however, this 
was also negotiated in the leaders’ summit before the party took action. 
The inner cabinets were used in Turkey largely in the form of coalition formation 
teams; however, senior partners usually refrained from putting it into effect during the 
crises. The nature of relations between the party leaders determined the management of 
crises. In the 1990s, apart from the ANAP-DYP government and DYP-CHP 
government, leaders had considerable working relations which allowed these cabinets 
to survive a number of crises. The last cabinet, that of DSP-MHP-ANAP, used the inner 
cabinet to resolve the disputes before they escalated into government crises and hence, 
this cabinet was the most durable coalition arrangement despite the severe challenges 
posed by economic difficulties, policy differences and a detrimental earthquake.  
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5.4. Turkish Exceptionalism? 
 
 
 
This chapter explored the dynamics of forming and maintaining governments in a 
comparative perspective. The major finding in this study is that rather than general 
attributes and characteristics of the party system, the interplay of several institutional 
mechanisms pertaining to the formation, functioning and termination of the 
governments created diverse trajectories. Hence, the country effects on the variance in 
cabinet duration were outcomes of interaction of a set of dynamics. In this sense, the 
Turkish experience with coalition politics in the 1990s does not constitute an exception. 
The case of Turkey has similarities with other countries as well as differences.  
Turkey and Italy have had the lowest cabinet duration values among the European 
countries. A number of respondents in the interviews argued that Turkish political 
system has yet to resolve its basic disputes over the regime. Specifically, the nature of 
cleavages in that period - the ethnic cleavage and the divide between the pro-Islamists 
and secularists – made it more difficult to reach concessions in the Turkish 
governments. In Europe, on the other hand, the debates were argued to be limited to the 
left-right politics rather than the essential characteristics of the political regime. This 
conception certainly has some truth in it. Cultural cleavages might be more difficult to 
manage compared to the economic cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). I believe that 
the influence of the cleavage structure, if any, is rather limited to government formation 
as it limits the number of potential coalitions. The controversy over RP has been an 
example in this respect. Moreover, these cleavages were not applicable to the formation 
of the rest of the six governments. As part of the political agenda constraints, the 
cleavages might continue to play a role, however, once a government takes office, its 
duration is by and large contingent on the relations and communication between the 
parties.  
Moreover, this study refutes the view that Turkish political culture has been 
responsible for the low level of cabinet durability in comparison to the majority of the 
European countries. This is not to deny the importance of cultural factors; however, I 
believe this argument confounds the fact that what is referred as the “coalition culture” 
in the interviews is rather a learning process engendered by certain practices and 
mechanisms. Therefore, rather than the absence or weakness of coalition culture, the 
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scope of political learning is more pertinent in the Turkish context. Political learning 
refers to reevaluation of ideas and attitudes by the political actors after severe crises and 
important social and political transformations (Bermeo, 1992, p. 274). Political learning 
may be an important source of political change in democracies (McCoy, 2000). 
Institutions may facilitate political learning. For example, the Netherlands was 
traditionally identified as a consociational democracy in which the leaders tended to 
cooperate (Lijphart, 1977; 1999). However, this was probably because the absence of 
the investiture requirement increased the freedom of movement and mechanisms were 
increasingly adopted to resolve the disputes between the government parties. Otherwise, 
inter-party conflict and mistrust was also common in Dutch politics until late 1970s 
(Timmermans and Moury, 2006).  
Another aspect of durability concerns coalition behavior. In both Italy and 
Turkey, the costs of coalition breaking have been low, inducing politicians to behave in 
an opportunistic way (Mershon, 1996). High electoral volatility and the fractionalized 
party system increased the tendency to call for early elections more frequently. In the 
absence of institutions which make it more arduous for the governing and opposition 
parties to break a government, these elements of the political system contributed to the 
premature termination of governments. Moreover, in both countries, alleged corrupt 
practices prevailed in this period. If legislation which aimed at strict control of the use 
of public funds, decreasing the patronage opportunities in the cabinet ministries was 
written, and if direct economic initiatives of the state could were made, office 
motivations might not have dominated the bargaining rounds. Instead, parties might 
have to focus more on the policies. In this regard, it might have be more likely for the 
coalition agreements to operate as modus vivendi for the prospective governments. As 
mentioned above, conflicts between the party leaders were more frequent when cabinets 
had vague compromises. The proliferation of policy-based coalition agreements might 
have contributed to the cabinet lifespan. Equally important has been the absence of 
consolidated conflict management mechanisms. As the DSP-MHP-ANAP government 
illustrated, such mechanisms could have been helpful in responding to government 
crises. In the rare occasion of these practices, inter-party relations have largely been left 
to the individual wills.  
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COCLUSIO 
 
 
 
 
A conservative cabinet member of the RP-DYP government articulated the 
skepticism of many Turkish voters towards the notion of the coalition government by 
saying “It is like a car with two drivers. One steps on the accelerator while the other 
puts his foot on the brake. This way or the other way, you crash in to the wall 
eventually”.1 Indeed, coalition governments in Turkey have been held responsible for a 
variety of problems. According to the critics, coalition governments are plagued by 
inherent stability and infighting between the government parties, which resulted in a 
poor economic performance record. This criticism has been widely espoused by 
different segments of the society. For example, a week before the general elections in 
2011, former Minister of Industry and Trade, Nihat Ergün argued that in the periods 
when the country was ruled predominantly by coalitions, the governments were short-
lived and these periods were characterized by the high levels of inflation and budget 
deficits; while the periods of party governments were replete with accomplishments.2 
This was also the central motto of the election campaign of the incumbent AKP 
government. Stability and growth were the recurrent themes in the billboards. The 
business associations have been among the leading skeptics as well. In a recent 
interview, the former president of the Đstanbul Chamber of Commerce accused the 
coalition governments of being susceptible to intervention of extra-parliamentary 
actors, notably the military, and, prone to triggering economic crises.3 Arguably, one of 
the reasons which united the liberal and conservative voters and led to the landslide 
                                                           
1 Interview on April 8, 2011. 
2 Meeting notes disseminated on the official website of the Ministry of Science, 
Industry and Technology, available at 
<http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/NewsDetails.aspx?newsID=1963&lng=tr>, (retrieved 
09.07.2011). 
3 “2001 Krizini Zayıf Koalisyon Hükümetleri Tetikledi – 2”, Zaman, 18.02.2011.  
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victory of AKP in the 2002 elections was the inaptitude of the coalition governments 
(Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 116).  
It is difficult to infirm the allegations empirically, however, the criticisms against 
the coalition governments are problematic in two major ways. First, the alleged causal 
relation between the type of government and political and economic instability may be 
spurious. The political turmoil and violence plaguing the political system in the 1970s 
again limited the capability of any government to rule effectively (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 
55). After all, two of the three military interventions (i.e. May 1960 and March 1971), 
came out after long periods of party governments in power. As far as the 1990s is 
concerned, high levels of inflation and unemployment along with the devaluated 
currency have been typical news in the daily newspapers. In these circumstances, it is 
questionable whether a majority party government could have performed better. 
Moreover, patronage has been a persistent characteristic of Turkish politics regardless 
of the ideological position and the type of government in power (Altun, 2004). In time, 
perpetrators of patronage and corruption, and, the social groups which enjoyed 
preferential access to the public resources changed; however, nepotism, favoritism and 
clientelism prevailed (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 66). There is also substantial empirical 
evidence on the spuriousness of the relation between the economic performance and the 
type of government (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002; Karaca, 2003; Tutar and Tansel, 2000; Eren 
and Bildirici, 2001). These studies confirm that the hypothesized relation cannot be 
verified. More importantly, the research emphasizes that party governments did not 
perform better than the coalition governments considering the macroeconomic 
indicators until recently. After all, the direction of causality is yet to be verified. 
The other misconception concerns cabinet durability. The most common adjective 
accompanying the concept of coalition governments turns out to be “short-lived” in the 
review of media coverage of the 1990s. However, this study provides contradictory 
empirical evidence. In the period between the end of the World War II and late 1990s, 
average duration of both types of cabinets varied between the countries in Western 
Europe. Besides, average cabinet duration improved in time in both party and coalition 
governments especially since the 1970s. The indifference with regard to the type of 
government suggests that stabilization of the political systems across Europe reinforced 
durability in general. When the number of party and coalition governments is compared 
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by decade, in each decade since 1940s, coalition governments outnumbered the party 
governments which took office, however, both tended to last longer. Majority party 
governments lasted longer on average in 1940s, 1970s and 1990s. However, it is 
important to see that the coalition governments were more durable in the 1950s and 
1960s although the two decades were quite turbulent and the countries were struggling 
with reconstruction after the World War II. Minimal winning coalitions tended to 
perform better with respect to duration compared to the surplus and minority cabinets in 
all decades. An interesting finding in this context concerns the minority coalitions. On 
average, frequency and duration of the minority coalition governments improved in 
European democracies since 1970s, although historically they have been the shortest-
lived arrangements. This finding also concurs in the positive impact of stabilization of 
the political system in general.  
Average cabinet duration also varied in Turkey across time. In general majority 
party governments were more durable compared to the coalition governments. 
However, coalition governments lasted longer in 1970s and 1990s as the party 
governments formed in these two decades did not enjoy the support of the majority in 
the parliament. Unlike the general trend in Western Europe, surplus governments 
performed better, followed by minimal winning and minority coalition governments 
with respect to duration. More interestingly, among the 15 coalition governments 
formed in the multiparty period, the cabinets made up of ideologically adjacent parties 
have been relatively short-lived. Severe competition between these parties for attracting 
the highly volatile electorate cultivated mistrust and prevented long-lasting 
collaboration. Nevertheless, duration of the coalition governments improved steadily 
from 1960s to 1970s and then to 1990s.  
My research on the coalition governments in Turkey in the 1990s and the 
comparative analysis yield three major findings with respect to the dynamics of cabinet 
durability. First, durability of the governments is partly a function of the circumstances 
of the political system. In other words, the political agenda puts constraints on the 
governments. When the tensions and the problems reach a level that makes the system 
ungovernable in practice, any government may fail to rule effectively regardless of its 
formation. The 1960s and mid-1990s illustrate this situation. In the in-depth interviews, 
the politicians often cited the characteristics of the political system in response to a 
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question as to why the coalition governments have been more durable in Western 
Europe compared to Turkey. Accordingly, they argued that in the countries where the 
major political actors reached a consensus on the founding principles of the political 
regime, the rest of the problems may be resolved with relative ease increasing the 
survival chances of the governments.4 In relation to this, the cleavage structure 
influences the nature of the challenges posed against the parties. While it is easier to 
solve the conflicts rooted in the left-right divide, issues turn into government crises 
more often if they were affiliated with other types of cleavages (e.g. the ethnic cleavage 
and the widening divide between the secularists and the pro-Islamists in Turkey). In my 
interviews, a number of respondents also emphasized the importance of a certain level 
of the economic development and well-being of a country for smooth functioning of the 
coalition governments.5 
Apart from these informal limitations, the political systems pose structural 
constraints as well. A highly fragmented party system might not be detrimental to 
durability in itself. The party systems of Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands were as 
fragmented as those of Turkey and Italy; however, the cabinets in these countries were 
more likely to survive the entire inter-election in the 1990s. It has been rather a 
combination of structural elements which influenced durability. In the fragmented party 
systems, where the level of polarization as well as electoral volatility were also high 
and a dominant core party around which alternative cabinets could be established did 
not exist, durable coalitions could not be built. This was the case in both Italy and 
Turkey in the 1990s. In Italy, the Christian Democratic Party (DC) served as a core 
party for coalitions in the period before the 1990s, however, transformation of the party 
system resulted in further fractionalization and emergence of smaller parties. In Turkey, 
absence of a core party around which alternative formulas may be developed 
contributed to the instability of the political system in the mid-1990s. In the first half of 
the 1990s, after the dissolution of the I. DYP-SHP cabinet, parties had difficulty in 
finding coalition partners. RP was an “illegitimate” actor in the eyes of many 
secularists; therefore, the coalition strategies aimed to exclude RP in the first place. The 
leaders of DYP and ANAP, Çiller and Yılmaz respectively, were in an intense 
                                                           
4 Interview on April 29, 2011. 
5 Interviews on April 22 and May 11, 2011. 
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competition for the leadership of the center-right. They tried to discredit each other in 
the eyes of the voters and sought to force each other to resign from the party leadership 
in every possible instance. SHP/CHP had been losing popular support and struggling 
with internal conflict. Thus, the two cabinets of DYP and SHP/CHP, after Demirel and 
Đnönü conveyed leadership to successors, were formed largely due to the bargaining 
failures for alternative cabinet compositions. Similarly, the ANAP-DYP and RP-DYP 
governments were also formed by necessity. However, partial stabilization of the 
political environment after 1997 was related to the rise of DSP as a viable and 
legitimate partner. Its electoral support base was different than ANAP, DYP and MHP. 
Moreover, personality of the leader of DSP, Ecevit, was respected by the leaders of 
these parties. In this period, DSP became the center of two coalition governments, and 
it was also one of the few minority governments which managed to get vote of 
confidence. 
Secondly, my research confirms the importance of the institutional settings for the 
coalition governments. The vote of confidence, known also as the investiture vote, is 
the principal institutional rule pertaining to government formation. Its existence leads to 
a tendency for oversize cabinets, which are arguably more prone to intra-governmental 
crises. It also decreases the chances for establishing tighter coalitions between 
ideologically compatible parties. The requirement of qualified majorities has similar 
implications. The countries in Western Europe either did not enforce the investiture 
vote or adopted measures to balance the repercussions of this rule on cabinet durability. 
In the countries where bargaining traditionally lasted long and governments were 
formed with relative difficulty, the institutional framework was amended so that once 
inaugurated, it would be difficult to overthrow an acting cabinet. The mechanism used 
for this purpose varied. In Germany, Belgium (after 1995) and Spain, a constructive 
vote of no confidence was enforced. In Ireland, the acting cabinet is preferred in the 
cases signaling potential bargaining failure. In countries such as Norway and Sweden, 
the inter-election is fixed to discourage opportunistic behavior of the parties. Similarly, 
in the United Kingdom, the prime minister did not have to resign after the elections. 
The ease of calling early elections, dissolving the cabinet and tabling interpellation in 
Italy and Turkey was remarkable considering relatively shorter durability compared to 
the other European democracies.  
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Apart from these rules pertaining to the formation and termination of the 
governments, one of the most important findings of this study is that governance 
mechanisms play a very important role in coalition maintenance. Despite the amplitude 
of the studies on the formation and termination of the governments, patterns of the 
interaction between the government parties were less analyzed. One of the main 
contributions of this study is its focus on the governance mechanisms in Turkey, an 
understudied aspect of coalition politics. It is in the nature of coalition politics that the 
senior partners of the cabinets attempt to impose their own decisions as the government 
policies. However, if this tendency reaches the level of ignoring the junior partner, it 
may become detrimental. The junior party may lose its motivation to maintain the 
cabinet as it cannot realize any of its expectations from joining the government. A 
number of mechanisms emerged in Western Europe to encourage intensive and 
continuous communication between the parties. These governing bodies have been 
active in Austria, Germany and the Nordic countries. Moreover, conflict management 
mechanisms were developed to prevent escalation of conflicts into deadlocks. It is 
noteworthy that both types of mechanisms were rare in Italy and Turkey. In Turkey, the 
coalition agreements were written, and included a number of clauses pertaining to the 
collective governance though sporadically. Working relations between the leaders of 
parties contributed to the functioning and durability in the I. DYP-SHP, ANAP-DSP-
DTP, and DSP-MHP-ANAP governments. We know that at least in one instance (in the 
DSP-MHP-ANAP government) a semi-institutional mechanism convening periodically 
at the top executive level was active. In Italy, the repercussions of the fragmented and 
polarized party system combined with feeble coalition governance. This made the 
country having the least durable coalition system in Western Europe. 
Thirdly, in relation to the second aspect mentioned above, coalition maintenance 
depends on the learning process. In my interviews, the respondents emphasized political 
culture as the most important factor which accounted for the variation in durability 
between the countries. A liberal conservative cabinet member, who served in three 
governments, associated underdevelopment of the “coalition culture” in Turkey with 
the general problems in the functioning of the democracy.6 He argued that interruption 
of the political system by the military interventions inhibited development of the 
                                                           
6 Interview on April 27, 2011.  
102 
 
coalition culture along with its repercussions on the democracy in general. However, I 
believe that an argument for the role of political culture in cabinet durability needs 
elaboration from another perspective. Just as the cultural dynamics are important in 
shaping the structures and institutions in a country, the infrastructure of a country 
impinge upon the characteristics of political culture. Existence of governing bodies and 
conflict management mechanisms contribute to building trust and communication 
networks, which in return, enhances the coalition discipline and unity. What is referred 
as the coalition culture may partly be the outcome of political learning in time.   
This aspect of coalition politics, involving a learning process for the major 
political actors, suggests that coalition governments may contribute to democracy. All 
of the interviewees except for three former ministers,7 agreed on the potential of the 
coalition governments to develop the politics of accommodation in Turkey. In this 
context, they emphasized that coalition governments are especially important in 
building mutual understanding and peaceful co-existence in heterogeneous and 
polarized societies. They also argued that multiparty governance may serve as a checks 
and balances system curbing authoritarian tendencies. However, for coalition 
governments to contribute to the functioning of the democratic system, the electoral 
threshold needs to be lowered so that a wider range of diversity will be included in 
governance.8  
I agree with the importance of these points and suggest that the capacity of 
coalition politics to contribute to the spread of democratic values in Turkey may be 
expanded, and durability of the coalition governments may be improved with a number 
of measures besides lowering the electoral threshold. As implied above, establishment 
and regulation of governing bodies and conflict management mechanisms may have a 
positive impact on building cooperation between the parties. The constitutional 
prerogatives of the head of state may be diminished to the level of classical 
parliamentary system so that s/he can play a more neutral role and have less freedom of 
movement while interfering in the affairs of the parliament. In its current status, Turkish 
presidents will be elected directly by popular vote which is a potential constraint on the 
                                                           
7 Interviews on April 6, 8; and May 6, 2011. 
8 Interviews on May 3 and 13, 2011. 
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functioning of prospective coalition governments in the future as a stronger president 
may act as a supra-parliamentary actor. One of the most important soft spots of the 
coalition governments, which weakened the legitimacy and credibility of the 
government parties, was the corruption charges. Strict measures against corruption and 
patronage are important for both increasing the social support to the governments, and 
prioritization of policy motivations in the place of office considerations in the formation 
of governments. Prioritization of policy preferences is important as this may lead to the 
formation of tighter cabinets, with clearly designated government program. Such 
cabinets may have better chances of performance and durability. Finally, I believe that 
consolidation of intra-party democracy is important. Throughout the 1990s, SHP/CHP 
and DYP struggled with severe intra-party conflict. To a lower extent, internal divisions 
within ANAP, DSP, and MHP also put pressure on the leaders. Escalation of the 
competition for the party leadership was related to the fact that diverse opinions could 
not be vocalized in the party executive boards. From the point of view of the 
oppositional groups within the parties, frail intra-party democracy gave the impression 
that taking hold of the leadership was the only way to express their demands. In this 
way, the decisions taken by the leaders may be more committed by the rest of the party 
members as these decisions would be pre-discussed within the party before they are 
made public.  
I believe in the potential of coalition politics for contributing to the functioning of 
the democratic system in Turkey; however, they have to be durable to enforce policies 
and to develop a politics of accommodation. In this study, I tried to understand the 
dynamics of cabinet durability in Turkey from a comparative perspective. In terms of its 
research question and its comparative framework, I believe it fills lacunae in the study 
of coalition politics in Turkey and in the wider literature.  
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APPEDIX 1 
 
 
LIST OF ITERVIEWS 
 
 
 
 
Interview 
o. 
Position 
Party 
Affiliation 
Location Date 
     
1 
 
Former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
DYP Đstanbul April 6, 2011 
 
2 
 
Former Minister of Culture 
 
RP 
 
Đstanbul 
 
April 8, 2011 
 
3 
 
Former PM 
 
ANAP 
 
Đstanbul 
 
April 22, 
2011 
 
4 
 
Former Minister of Interior 
 
MHP 
 
via phone 
 
April 26, 
2011 
5 
 
Former Minister of National 
Defense, Former Deputy PM 
DYP and 
DTP 
Ankara 
April 27, 
2011 
 
6 
 
Former Minister of Justice 
 
DSP 
 
Ankara 
 
April 27, 
2011 
7 
 
Former Minister of Energy 
and Natural Resources 
MHP Ankara 
April 29, 
2011 
8 
 
Deputy PM, Former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
SHP and 
CHP 
Ankara 
April 29, 
2011 
 
9 
 
Former Minister of State 
 
DYP 
 
Ankara 
 
April 30, 
2011 
 
 
10 
 
Former MP 
 
DYP and 
ANAP 
 
Ankara 
 
April 30, 
2011 
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11 Former MP MHP Ankara April 30, 
2011 
 
12 
 
Former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
DSP Đstanbul May 3, 2011 
13 Former Minister of Forestry DYP Ankara May 6, 2011 
14 
 
Former Minister of National 
Defense; and Justice 
ANAP Ankara May 6, 2011 
 
15 
 
Former Minister of State 
 
SHP and CHP 
 
Đstanbul 
 
May 11, 
2011 
 
16 
 
Former Minister of Culture 
 
SHP and CHP 
 
Đstanbul 
 
May 13, 
2011 
 
17 
 
Former Political Advisor 
 
SHP 
 
Đstanbul 
 
May 16, 
2011 
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APPEDIX 2 
 
 
SAMPLE QUESTIO SHEET FROM THE I-DEPTH ITERVIEWS 
 
 
 
 
Görüşme Tarihi: 
 
Görüşmenin Başlangıç Saati: 
 
 
 
Öncelikle size kendimi tanıtayım. Benim ismim Hasret Dikici Bilgin. Bu çalışma 
doktora tezimin parçası. Tezimin konusu 1991–2002 dönemi koalisyon hükümetleri. 
Neden bazı koalisyon hükümetlerinin çıkan bütün krizlere karşın uzun yıllar sürerken 
diğerlerinin kısa sürede sona erdiğini anlamaya çalışıyorum. Bu kapsamda 
hükümetlerin kurulma süreçlerini, koalisyon müzakerelerini, kurulduktan sonra 
karşılaştıkları güçlükleri aşma çabalarını ve sona erişlerini inceliyorum. Bu 
gazeteciliğin ötesinde bir siyaset bilimi çalışmasıdır. Sorularımı bu şekilde 
değerlendirmenizi rica ediyorum. Görüşmemiz tezim dışında herhangi bir yerde 
kullanılmayacaktır. Görüşmemizi kaydedebilir miyim?  
 
Sayın ..., .... partisinden ... milletvekili olarak ... hükümetinde .... görevinde bulundunuz. 
Size bu hükümetle ilgili sorular yönelteceğim.  
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Questions on the Bargaining and Government Formation 
 
Sizin görev aldığınız dönemde seçimler şöyle sonuçlanmıştı: ... Partinizde genel eğilim 
kurulacak bir hükümette görev alma yönünde miydi, yoksa muhalefette kalma isteği var 
mıydı?  
 
Siz kişisel olarak nasıl bir hükümet formülünü tercih ediyordunuz? 
 
Hangi partilerle görüşüldü? Varsa önceki görüşmeler neden başarısız oldu? 
 
Sizin de içinde yer aldığınız hükümet için teklif hangi partiden geldi? 
 
Koalisyon görüşmelerine kimler katıldı?  
 
Koalisyon müzakerelerinde neler görüşüldü? Hükümet programı ve koalisyon protokolü 
belirlenirken hangi konular çok tartışma konusu oldu? Uzlaşmazlık konuları nasıl 
aşıldı? 
 
Bakanlık dağılımı nasıl kararlaştırıldı? Siz parti ve birey olarak burada hangi 
bakanlıkları istiyordunuz? Neden? Peki sandalye sayınız düşünüldüğünde adil bir 
dağılım oldu mu? Genel olarak bakanlıklar bu hükümette adil dağıldı mı?  
 
 
Questions on Coalition Governance 
 
 
Bu hükümette kararlar nasıl alınıyordu?  
 
En çok hangi partiler arasında çatışma yaşandı?  
 
Hangi konular ortaklar arasında kriz haline geldi? Bunlar nasıl aşıldı? Kriz çözmesiyle 
ünlü biri var mıdır? 
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Hükümet kurulduktan sonra bir dizi olay oldu. Bu olaylar karşısında hükümet nasıl 
hareket etti? 
 
Sizce uyumlu bir hükümet miydi? Hükümet ortağınız olan parti hakkında ne 
düşünüyorsunuz?  
 
 
Questions on Governance and Termination 
 
 
Sizce bu hükümeti sona götüren eas olaylar hangileriydi? Neler yapılabilse hükümet 
sürebilirdi? 
 
Hükümetin sona ermesinde parti örgütünden gelen baskılar oldu mu?  
 
Medya hükümetin sona ermesinde sizce etkili oldu mu? 
 
O dönemde RP/FP hükümete karşı nasıl tavır aldı? Bu partinin meclisteki varlığı sizce 
hükümeti etkiledi mi, etkilediyse ne şekilde etkiledi?  
 
Genel olarak Milli Görüş çizgisinden gelen bir partinin ve ardıllarının mecliste 
bulunuşu bu hükümetler için istikrarsızlaştırıcı ya da ömür uzatıcı bir rol oynadı mı? 
 
Genel olarak dahil olduğunuz bu hükümet dönemin diğer hükümetlerine göre, hele de 
çok önemli sorunlarla karşı karşıya kaldığı düşünülürse oldukça uzun ömürlü/kısa 
ömürlü oldu. Bunu neye bağlıyorsunuz? 
 
Cumhurbaşkanının hükümeti kuracak lideri ataması, nitelikli çoğunluk vs hakkında ne 
düşünüyorsunuz?  
 
Sizce o dönemdeki siyasi ortam hükümetin kuruluşunu ve devamını ne şekilde etkiledi?  
 
Sizce koalisyon hükümetleri kısa ömürlü olmaya mahkûm mudur? Neden?  
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Sizce Batı Avrupa’daki koalisyonlar Türkiye’dekilerden daha uzun ömürlü müdür? 
Bunun nedeni nedir? 
 
Son olarak Türkiye’de koalisyonlara karşı olumsuz bir tavır var. Kısa ömürlü 
olacakları, istikrarsızlığa yol açacakları düşünülüyor. Oysa Batı Avrupa’da halk 
koalisyonlara bu kadar olumsuz bakmıyor. Sizce neden böyle bir durum var? 
Koalisyonlar demokrasiye katkıda bulunabilir mi? 
 
Değerli görüşlerinizi benimle paylaştığınız için teşekkür ederim.  
110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEDIX 3 
 
 
 
 
ame of 
the 
Cabinet 
Cabinet 
Composition 
Date of 
Inauguration 
Date of 
Formal 
Resignation 
Cabinet Type 
Cabinet 
Duration.. 
(in days) 
VIII. Đnönü  CHP-AP 20.11.1961 25.06.1962 
surplus 
majority 
217 
IX. Đnönü 
CHP-YTP-
CKMP 
25.06.1962 25.12.1963 
surplus 
majority 
548 
X. Đnönü 
CHP-
independents 
25.12.1963 20.02.1965 
minority 
coalition 
423 
Ürgüplü 
AP-CKMP-
YTP-MP 
20.02.1965 27.10.1965 
surplus 
majority 
249 
I. Ecevit CHP-MSP 26.01.1974 17.11.1974 
 
surplus 
majority 
295 
IV. 
Demirel 
AP-MSP-
CGP-MHP 
31.03.1975 21.06.1977 
 
surplus 
majority 
813 
V. Demirel 
AP-MSP-
MHP 
21.07.1977 05.01.1978 
 
minimal 
winning  
168 
III. Ecevit 
CHP-CGP-
DP-
independents 
05.01.1978 12.11.1979 
surplus 
majority 
676 
VII. 
Demirel 
DYP-SHP 20.11.1991 16.05.1993 
surplus 
majority 
543 
I. Çiller DYP-SHP 25.06.1993 05.10.1995 
 
minimal 
winning  
832 
III. Çiller DYP-CHP 30.10.1995 06.03.1996 
 
minimal 
winning  
128 
II. Yılmaz ANAP-DYP 06.03.1996 28.06.1996 
 
minority 
coalition 
114 
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Erbakan RP-DYP 28.06.1996 30.06.1997 surplus 
majority 
367 
III. Yılmaz 
ANAP-DSP-
DTP 
30.06.1997 11.01.1999 
 
minority 
coalition 
560 
V. Ecevit 
DSP-MHP-
ANAP 
28.05.1999 19.11.2002 
 
surplus 
majority 
1271 
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